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Summary
External support is essential to the development of the African Standby Force
(ASF), an African-led mechanism for crisis management and peace
consolidation in Africa. This research paper examines external support to the
ASF by several bilateral and multinational contributors, assessing its strengths
and limits, and attempts to measure the significance of the support to the
aspired outcome.
The starting point of the study is an analysis of the fast-evolving ASF project,
which has gone through many phases of definition and redefinition since it was
conceived in the late 1990s. The ASF, it is argued, is a ‘moving target’, due to
the inability of African stakeholders to settle on a clear concept, setting
themselves ever more ambitious goals at every stage. Partners simultaneously
suffer from, and contribute to this state of affairs. Whilst coordination efforts are
undertaken, partners’ support too often still responds to national (for bilateral
donors) or institutional interests (for multilateral ones), each partner using the
leeway created by the conceptual ambiguities of the ASF to press its own
priorities. Given the overwhelming role of partners in the conceptual maturation
of the ASF, and the impact of their funding decisions, this is turn exacerbates
the confusion about the true direction of its development. Said differently, the
ASF is burdened by the lack of political, conceptual, and financial ownership on
the side of the recipients, who are also its main stakeholders. The result is at
best an ambiguous partnership, and at worst a waste of human resources,
financial means and political capital.
Attempting to differentiate between degrees of ‘ownership’, the study concludes
that it is only if AU member states make a conscious effort to increase their
political, conceptual and especially, financial, stake in the ASF that they will
credibly demonstrate that it is not an entirely foreign-mastered project, but a
real ‘African solution to African problems’.
Keywords: regional security; ASF; APSA; donors; ownership.
Olaf Bachmann is a PhD student at the Department of War Studies, King’s
College, London. He is based in Libreville, Gabon, in Central Africa. This paper
is based on his MA ‘War in the Modern World’ dissertation. It was subsequently
revised and updated for publication at the invitation of IDS. Directly converging
with IDS’s interest in exploring the international dynamics of conflict, peace and
development, Mr Bachmann’s research naturally fits into IDS series. The
present paper was conceived in consultation with Dr David K. Leonard
(Professorial Fellow in Governance, IDS), and Dr Niagalé Bagayoko (Head of
Peacekeeping and Peace Consolidation at the International Organisation of La
Francophonie and former Fellow, IDS). Christopher Vanja provided valuable
suggestions for improving and updating the earlier version. Further comments
are welcome and can be sent to olaf.2.bachmann@kcl.ac.uk.
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Executive summary
The end of the Cold War sent shock waves not only across Europe, but also
across Africa. After the events in Rwanda and the international community’s
indecisiveness and incoherence in approaching the crisis in Somalia in 1994,
African leaders realised that they had to take things into their own hands if they
did not want the continent to sink into chaos. The drive for an ‘African
renaissance’, spearheaded by a small vanguard of African leaders, was marked
by the search for ‘African solutions to African problems’. Nowhere was this
truer than in the peace and security field, where the African Peace and Security
Architecture (APSA) was conceived, with the African Standby Force (ASF) as
the flagship project at its core.
Similarly to its twin project in the economic field, NEPAD (New Partnership for
African Development), the ASF attracted the immediate interest of many
bilateral and multilateral partners.
The birth and evolution of the ASF
In truth, the ASF was worked out by the African Chiefs of Defence as early as
the late 1990s, but it found its true political impetus in the African Union’s
Constitutive Act (2000), which gave the new Union the right to intervene in a
member state in grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and
crimes against humanity. The ASF was later earmarked as one of the major
tools at the hands of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) created in 2002 as
the Union’s standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management
and resolution of conflicts.
Strongly influenced by the Rwandan and Somali traumas, the initial concept of
the ASF was that of a quick reaction capacity that would enable Africans to
respond swiftly to a crisis unhampered by the heavy political and institutional
burdens typical of the United Nations, but with the UN taking over after six
months or so to assume the tasks of stabilisation and peace consolidation. The
concept was later refined and broken down into six scenarios comprising:
(i) observation and monitoring missions; (ii) preventive deployments in the case
of rising political tensions; (iii) humanitarian assistance missions; (iv) traditional
peacekeeping operations; (v) peace support in a non-permissive environment;
and (vi) forceful intervention in a member state in grave circumstances.
The ASF was to be based on standby arrangements with the continent’s five
sub-regions, each providing a brigade-sized contribution. From day one it was
decided that the brigades would be multidimensional, including military, police
and civilian components. However, the first ‘ASF Roadmap’ spelling out the
stages of development of the ASF to 2010 reflect the strong military slant of the
initial design, worked out mainly by the military establishments of the member
states and supported by the mainly military establishments of international
partners.
As the AU gained field experience with its first field mission, AMIS (African
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Union Mission in Sudan), more and more diversified partners gained interest,
and the UN experience of multidimensional operations looked more and more
relevant, the necessity to rebalance the original concept appeared more and
more obvious. Thus, the 2nd Roadmap, adopted in July 2008, mandated
accelerated work on the civilian and police dimensions. At the same time, it set
out a considerable burden of the task to be accomplished over the next two
years, including: further work on headquarter capacity both at the AU and in
the regions; decision-making and mandate issues; logistics depots; strategic
lift; the rapid deployment capacity (RDC); and a variety of specific but
nonetheless important domains such as medical and legal issues. It was
already clear, although unsaid at the time, that the full operationalisation of the
ASF by 2010, as foreseen in Roadmap I, could not be achieved.
A major exercise held in October 2010 with the help of partners, ‘Amani Africa’,
confirms what the observation of AU field operations such as AMIS and the AU
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have demonstrated:
 Although strategic HQs have been established, the AU and the regions lack
mission planning capacity, and in particular the capacity to plan across
dimensions;
 The police and civilian components of the ASF remain significantly weaker
than their military counterparts;
 Communications and interoperability between military, police, and civilians
in the field remain low;
 Administrative, financial and human resources management capacity
remain too weak compared to the task at hand;
 African missions remain heavily dependent on external support for the
entire range of their logistics needs, from strategic deployment to field
logistics, as well as for their CIS (communications and information systems)
needs;
 A situation of quasi-total financial dependence on external donors
characterises African capacity-building efforts as well as operations.
An awareness of those shortcomings, even before ‘Amani Africa’, had yielded
its results, and led African actors and partners to set a new deadline, in 2015,
for the full operationalisation of the ASF in draft Roadmap III produced in 2010.
At the same time, the new Roadmap, which has yet to be endorsed, does not
disallow very ambitious targets, such as the standing of a Rapid Deployment
Capacity by end 2012.
The ASF: A ‘moving target’
It is clear, however, from recent conceptual work and recent and ongoing
operations that the AU’s and RECs’ aims are now pitched at the upper end of
the scale of scenarios developed in the original Roadmap. An upward trend is
visible in three directions:
 from the ‘fire brigade’ type of operation carried out by an agile, relatively
unsophisticated ASF nipping the crisis in the bud before the UN takes over,
to scenarios where Africans themselves assume peace consolidation tasks
over the long run;
 from mainly military to multidimensional missions endowed with the whole
range of civilian and police components;
 from low-risk deployments in relatively peaceful context to operations in
environments with a high level of ‘spoilers’.
The Rapid Deployment Capacity, which has now been placed upfront in the list
of priorities, combines quick reaction and multidimensionality, blurring the
picture further and/or setting the target even higher. Adding to the level of
complexity, new tasks have appeared on the list of possible ASF commitments,
including disaster relief and naval operations.
No open debate, however, has been carried out on those evolving
assumptions, their political underpinnings or feasibility requirements. The ASF,
therefore, is a moving target, built on non-addressed issues and high
expectations. This is probably why draft Roadmap III identifies the need to
review the six original scenarios underpinning the ASF as part of a more
current ‘ASF vision’.
Donor response
From the birth of the ASF project, bilateral donors have been very responsive.
In truth it was with a sigh of relief that large Western nations saw African
countries taking more direct responsibility for their own security as the costs of
UN operations on the continent were reaching staggering levels, African
conflicts looked as intractable as ever, and Western interests shifted more and
more toward the Middle East and South Asia. As of 2002, for four years in a
row, Africa was a key item on the agenda of the G8. Multilateral donors
followed suite, with a real ‘breakthrough’ in support represented by the launch
of the EU African Peace Facility (APF) in 2004, which provided much relief to
the cash-strapped AU and regional communities.
International partners’ support responds to a variety of interests. While bilateral
donors are more clearly motivated by national security interests, multilateral
partners respond to a more institutional approach underpinned by an
ambiguous concept of ‘partnership’, although the financial and political interests
of their member states are never far behind.
Bilateral donors
United States
Although the US has repeatedly been accused of turning its back on Africa, it is
one of the major providers of PSO (peace support operation) support to the
continent. The disastrous mission to Somalia and the Rwandan crisis in 1994
powerfully contributed to convincing Washington of the necessity to enable the
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Africans to help themselves. The constant rise in the UN peacekeeping budget,
of which the US pays 26 per cent, was an additional incentive.
Besides its capacity-building initiative, the US has also given significant in-kind
support, mainly in the form of logistics and technical assistance, to African-led
PSOs since AMIS. For example, it supported rotation of troops to AMISOM and
it has made major contributions to the field logistics, equipment, and mobility of
UN and AU peacekeepers.
Canada
Canada has long been supporting African peacekeepers on a bilateral basis. Its
support is more broadly based than that of the US, encompassing military,
police (via the well-known Pearson Centre) and, more and more, civilians (via
the Réseau francophone des opérations de paix). In the recent past, it has
been the driving force in a political effort to put African peace and security on
the agenda of the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) and is
one of the major sponsors of an increasingly large number of activities
undertaken by the OIF to support PSO training. Canada is also a major
supporter of African-led PSOs, providing logistics, training, equipment and
financial support at levels equivalent to those of the US and close to those of
the EU to operations such as AMIS and UNAMID (United Nations/African Union
Mission in Darfur).
France
Even more clearly than the US, France has striven to adapt its military
presence in Africa, inherited from colonialism, to the parameters of the APSA.
From bilateral, its cooperation has become increasingly multilateral since the
early 2000s, focusing on the Regional Economic Communities (RECs)
(primarily ECOWAS, subsequently ECCAS), and later the AU. France has also
been attempting to ‘europeanise’ its support to the ASF, transferring its well-
known RECAMP programme (Renforcement des capacités africaines de
maintien de la paix) to European level (RECAMP served to develop the original
Amani Africa exercise concept), and second by attracting EU and partner
support to specific training centres on its priority list. Like Washington’s, Paris’s
cooperation is more developed on the military side, but it tends to include more
technical assistance at HQs, in addition to staff and units training. Similarly to
the US and Canada, France is an important provider of operational and
logistics support to African TCCs (troop-contributing countries), focusing on
francophone countries.
United Kingdom
Like other donors, but at a slightly earlier stage, the UK has reshaped its peace
and security assistance to Africa to match continental developments. The UK
pioneered the ‘whole of government approach’, connecting all national efforts
into a single cross-departmental strategy financed and implemented through an
Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP). The ACPP finances a wide array of
activities. Among them is the presence of conflict and PSO advisers with the
AU and the RECs, and key staff in major training institutions. PSO and other
advisers in carefully selected positions have enabled the UK to exercise a
major influence on the conceptual development of the ASF over the past few
years. Much of the British support also goes into training, with a concentration
on the Karen Centre in Kenya in the recent past and a move out of the Kofi
Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, which received the
bulk of London’s attention in earlier years.
Germany
Germany’s engagement in African peace and security issues is on the rise,
resulting from a mixture of public pressure to increase development aid and
pragmatic considerations linked to the burden represented by Berlin’s 9 per
cent contribution to the UN peacekeeping budget and EU’s budget supporting
Africa (24 per cent). In contrast with most national donors, German support
squarely targets regional and sub-regional organisations, including the AU, the
RECs, and training centres. Thematically, Germany’s involvement focuses on
police and civilian capacity-building, but it also includes important contributions
to various activities in conflict prevention and institutional consolidation. Most of
the assistance is channelled via the former German GtZ, Gesellschaft für
technische Zusammenarbeit, now GIZ, Gesellschaft für internationale
Zusammenarbeit.
Denmark
Similarly to Germany, Denmark conceives itself as a loyal, disinterested
partner, willing to support Africa’s own aims. However, it has stronger
conceptual convictions inspired by a long-lasting involvement with the UN.
Denmark’s management of its peace and security policy, like that of other
donors, has been adjusted to match APSA developments. The Danish Task
Force Africa, established at the Ministry of Defence, is tasked with coordinating
all Danish defence efforts in support of APSA with other Nordic countries, the
UK and the US.
Norway
Norwegian support to the ASF is delivered mostly through the Training for
Peace (TfP) programme. TfP is a civilian capacity-building scheme launched in
1995. It has two components – an operational training one, addressing police
and civilian experts participating in ongoing PSOs, and a normative one,
supporting the UN, the AU and the RECs via policy advice and research. TfP is
a financially modest programme compared to those of other donors. However,
by targeting early a little-trodden domain of expertise, and underpinning
training and policy advice with research, TfP has achieved effects much
beyond some of the better-endowed programmes.
Italy
Italy’s contribution to African PSOs revolves around the training of Formed
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Police Units (FPUs), directly stemming from its own PSO experience in the
Balkans. Italy hosts the Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units
(CoESPU), created in Vincenza in 2004 with US support. In July 2008, Italy
rebranded its till then little known support for African PSOs the ‘Italian African
Peace Facility’ and increased financial contribution significantly. Most of this
contribution, however, is channelled to AMISOM, reflecting Italy’s traditional
interests on the continent.
Japan
Japan’s interest in building capacity for African PSOs is directly related to its
share of the UN peacekeeping budget (17 per cent), and partly to its interest in
keeping the surroundings of the African continent safe for trade. Japan
supports training at regional training centres in the non-military field. It is also
one of the few donors to direct resources to the AU Peace Fund (covering, for
example, salaries of AU liaison offices at AMISOM).
Multilateral donors
European Union
The EU has to be considered as an actor in its own right, separate from its
member states. This is particularly so since the creation of the African Peace
Facility (APF) in 2004, which made the European Commission a major enabler
of the ASF. The APF has provided the AU and the RECs with a fairly sizeable,
predictable and so far irreplaceable source of funding for African PSOs. It has
also placed the EU in a leading role in AU and REC capacity development at
HQ levels via the financing of numerous technical assistance missions.
The EU is committed to pursuing its support. €300 million have been
earmarked for the APF over the period 2008–13, of which €65 million will go to
capacity-building, and €200 million to PSOs. This is in addition to EU support
via so-called Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs), which earmark an ever
growing share of funding to peace and security.
United Nations
The United Nations (UN) is not a ‘donor’, but an important provider of technical
assistance and source of conceptual inspiration for the AU. The UN strongly
influenced the initial ASF concept, based on the assumption of a prompt
transition between African and UN missions, and its experience of complex,
multidimensional PSOs, has imposed itself on the basis of hard AU experience
in Darfur and Somalia.
The UN high-level political commitment made at the World Summit in 2005 to
deploy a ten-year capacity-building plan to support the AU in the fields of
‘training, military, police, logistics, finance, and communication’ has given the
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations the leeway needed to export its
standards and concepts with lasting impact on the AU and the RECs.
Donor support balance sheet
Donor support can be measured in terms of coherence and in terms of impact.
Coherence
The lack of clarity in the assumptions underpinning the ASF largely explains
the discrepancies and lack of coherence in donor support. As long as all
assumptions remain potentially valid, and none has clear authority over the
others, each donor remains free to ‘pick and choose’ among the components of
the ASF that best match its national or institutional preferences or habits. This
makes donor coordination even more vital, but such coordination remains ever
a challenge as: (a) donor coordination is time and effort consuming; (b) each
donor is motivated by its own national or institutional interests; (c) there is a
degree of competition among donors, primarily for reasons of political visibility
on the international scene and before home constituents.
Donor coordination from the AU/RECs themselves remains subject to two
constraints: (a) with less coordinated donors, African institutions have more
leeway to request overlapping funding; (b) neither the AU nor the RECs have
the capacity to coordinate donors – they are mostly overwhelmed by the
number and variety of donor approaches.
The consequence is gaps, overlaps and, in the case of military training or
equipment, problems of inter-operability in the field.
Impact
Passing judgement on impact is extremely difficult, as much of the institutional
capacity-building work is very recent and the depth of experience yet
insufficient for a collective assessment of the performance of AU and RECs
staff. What can be said is that lasting shortcomings in numbers, especially at
the AU, despite donors’ readiness to finance posts, remain an important
constraint. A more positive indicator is conceptual development, where donors’
support has allowed the AU/RECs to make substantial progress over time. A
key question mark remains over the effectiveness and relevance of units and
troops training. This is an issue with which donors have struggled for a number
of years, and which is reputedly difficult to document. Scattered evidence
provides a highly mixed picture.
African ownership balance sheet
International donors and African recipients share a common objective:
lessening Africa’s dependence on international action or inaction, and
increasing its capacity to react quickly and appropriately to prevent conflict
escalation and eventually establish lasting peace. ‘Ownership’ has thus been
the mantra of donors’ programmes, together with the motto of ‘partnership’.
Distinguishing various levels of ‘ownership’, the balance sheet on the African
side looks as follows:
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 ‘Ideological ownership’, as measured by the reiteration of high-level
statements endorsing the common ASF goals since the early 2000s, can be
considered as achieved;
 The picture is mixed as regards ‘political ownership’, defined as the
willingness of African states to participate in actual ASF operations: whilst
Africa has demonstrated its determination to undertake PSOs, the level of
participation of various states has remained uneven;
 ‘Sociological ownership’, as a kind of emotional adhesion to the ASF project
and personal commitment to contribute to it, is shared by small groups of
specialists working on the ASF at AU and RECs HQs, but hardly to be
perceived in national institutions;
 ‘Technical ownership’, characterised by the understanding, acceptance and
ability to implement ASF concepts, can be described as poor, to the extent
that work on the ASF has largely been led by military establishments, and
remains little understood by other relevant agencies or ministries, or by AU
and RECs services outside those directly responsible;
 ‘Financial ownership’, remains but a distant objective: the lack of
autonomous financing is the Achilles’ heel of the ASF.
Conclusion
There is no alternative to helping Africans help themselves. Neither is there
peacekeeping on the cheap, whether for the Africans, who will sooner or later
have to take the lead, nor for external partners, who will pursue their supportive
role for the foreseeable future. It is only by proactively assuming political,
conceptual and financial ownership that AU member states will credibly
demonstrate that the ASF is not an entirely foreign-mastered project and that
the solutions they bring to African problems are truly ‘African’.
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 67
20
21
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 67
1 Introduction
The end of the Cold War sent shock waves not only across Europe, but also
across Africa. After the events in Rwanda and the international community’s
indecisiveness and incoherence in approaching the crisis in Somalia in 1994,
African leaders realised that they had to take things into their own hands if they
did not want the continent to sink into chaos. The drive for an ‘African
renaissance’, spearheaded by a small vanguard of African leaders, was marked
by the search for ‘African solutions to African problems’. Nowhere was this
truer than in the peace and security field, where the African Peace and Security
Architecture (APSA) was conceived, with the African Standby Force (ASF) as
the flagship project at its core.
Similarly to its twin project in the economic field, NEPAD (New Partnership for
African Development), the ASF attracted the immediate interest of many
bilateral and multilateral partners. In truth it was with a sigh of relief that large
Western nations saw African countries taking more direct responsibility for their
own security as the costs of UN operations on the continent were reaching
staggering levels. African conflicts looked as intractable as ever, and Western
interests shifted more and more toward the Middle East and South Asia.
Great hopes were immediately invested in the ASF project. As the ‘Framework
Document’ and the first ‘Roadmap’ were adopted in 2003–2005, it was
foreseen that, with the combined efforts of the African Union (AU), the Regional
Economic Communities (RECs) and the partners, the ASF would reach full
operational status by 2010. As the deadline approached, however, it was
obvious to all that results had remained below expectations: drawing lessons
from the major Command Post Exercise ‘Amani Africa’, in early 2011, ‘ASF
Roadmap III’ moved the operationalisation target to 2015.
Why did this gap between expectations and results arise? Did the partners fail
in delivering effective support? Or were the Africans themselves not up to the
task? Could it even be that the ASF concept was not as sound and stable as it
appeared in the first place?
Such are the questions which this report aims to disentangle, focusing on
external support initiatives to the ASF by several bilateral and multinational
contributors, their strengths and potential deficiencies, and the significance of
the support to the desired outcome. This, however, cannot be done without an
examination of Africa’s own efforts, shortcomings and progress.
Following a brief methodological Section 2, Section 3 of the report therefore
reviews the history and rationale for the ASF, as it emerged from the desire to
generate responses to African conflicts, and describes the rapid evolution of
the concept in recent years. Building on a brief review of lessons learned from
past and current African peace support operations (PSOs) in Section 4, Section
5 attempts to take stock of the development of the ASF across its different
components (headquarters (HQ) capacity, units training, logistics, funding,
etc.), providing a mixed picture of shortcomings and achievements. Chapter 6
draws on those experimental findings, analysing the lower-than-expected
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results as a consequence of the ambiguity of the ASF project, which remains –
at this point, a ‘moving target’ subject to many interpretations. Chapter 7 offers
an extensive review of donor support with the aim of assessing the impact and
cohesion of the contribution of nine national and two multinational external
actors. As it demonstrates, the balance sheet can only be judged reservedly as
positive, as the ambiguities remaining around the goal pursued leave every
contributor free to pick and choose, compounding the natural bias of its
national or institutional interests. On that basis, it is possible to draw a
conclusion on the further aim, ‘African ownership’, which both Africans and
donors claim to share. Distinguishing between different levels of ownership,
Section 8 concludes that the Achilles’ heel of the ASF remains, as ever, the
lack of ‘financial ownership’: as long as Africa is unable to muster a minimal
basis for the autonomous financing of the ASF, its aspiration to set up an
African-led mechanism for crisis management and peace consolidation in Africa
will remain but a distant objective.
2 Methodology
Donors surveyed in this study include nine of the largest providers of official
development aid (ODA), as well as the EU, a major provider of ODA in its own
right, and the UN, because of its specific role. Although most of the support for
the ASF does not qualify as ODA, its major providers are also the major ODA
donors (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 2007).
Collecting information for the present study was not an easy task. First, as will
be demonstrated below, the ASF is a constantly evolving project, with new
decisions, new concepts and new experiences emerging every day. Second,
there is no single definition of what qualifies as ‘support for the ASF’. For
some, institutional support to the AU in the field of human resources or
communications management, for example, which is not ASF-dedicated but will
make the Force easier to manage at the strategic level, is considered support
to the ASF; for others it is not. To make the subject manageable, the decision
was made to abide by the choice of individual donors or recipients in each
particular case.
Third, even if there is agreement on what qualifies as ‘support for the ASF’,
channels by which money or technical assistance is provided are numerous,
even for a single donor. For large ones, like the European Union (EU), it is
hardly possible to find one single person who possesses a comprehensive view
in the entire institution. This is why the choice was made to concentrate on the
most important programmes, in financial volume and duration. Fourth it is
impossible, at any given time, to obtain a complete picture encompassing
programmes signed, funds committed, actual expenditure, etc. even for a
single donor, and even less for a combination of donors as programme
durations are widely different.1 Systematic comparisons across donors would
not be meaningful. This is why findings in Section 7 have been presented in a
donor-by-donor fashion. This lack of comparability across donors cannot be
compensated for by inquiries with African beneficiaries as both the AU and the
Regional Economic Communities (RECs) – which are the most important
1 Interview, EU Commission official, Addis Ababa (all interviews in Addis Ababa in April 2009, otherwise
dated).
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recipients – have still underdeveloped reporting procedures. This explains why
most of the information collected comes from donor, rather than African
sources.
In order to overcome those limitations affecting access to sources of
information, desk research was combined with semi-directive interviews with
key actors involved in developing or supporting the ASF. Interviews were thus
carried out at the EU and her permanent member states’ representations in
Brussels, in Addis Ababa with AU and United Nations (UN) staff and
representatives of various donors, and in Libreville – the seat of the Economic
Community of Central African States (ECCAS), where this author is based – for
additional insights into one of the RECs. Interviews produced a wealth of
information, both factual and in terms of how various actors assess progress.
They were also an important channel to access a vast area of recent ‘grey
literature’ on the ASF, as many documents remain work in progress, or have
not been published or widely distributed.
3 The African Standby Force:
rationale and history
3.1 African solutions to African problems
Soon after the end of the Cold War in 1989, it must have been clear to African
leaders that their countries had lost their strategic value as allies in the great
ideological confrontation. When the Security Council failed to authorise UN
intervention in Rwanda in 1994, letting the most horrible genocide unfold
before the world’s eyes, the proof of the international community’s neglect was
unmistakable. The subsequent indecisiveness of the United States (US) and its
incoherence in approaching the crisis in Somalia was a further indicator of the
declining reliability of Western policy – at a time when Russia itself was in
disarray and China not yet the alternative anchor it would later become. African
leaders realised that they had to take things into their own hands if they did not
want the continent to sink into chaos.
The end of the Cold War had a powerful impact on Africa in another way. With
the ‘end of history’, as Francis Fukuyama proclaimed it, it became clear that
the status quo in African political and economic orders was no longer tenable
(Fukuyama 1992). African leaders had no choice but to adapt to what seemed
at the time to be the single model: democracy on the political front, free market
in production and trade. The faith of many in and outside Africa that change
was possible was reinforced by the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa
and credibly demonstrated by the policies of successive South African leaders,
Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki.
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With the mood prevailing that Africa was rife for change and actually aspiring to
it, it was possible for a small vanguard of African leaders to spearhead a drive
for an ‘African renaissance’ marked by the overhauling of old institutions and
the launch of bold new initiatives, and to initialise a revolution in values
(Meredith 2006: 680). The new millennium thus opened with the decision of
African leaders to replace the unwieldy Organisation of African Unity (OAU)
with the AU and to launch the New Partnership for African Development
(NEPAD) to boost a radical drive to lift the continent out of poverty. The new
institutions were to be underpinned by a radical change in political standards.
All of a sudden, sovereignty seemed no longer to be an absolute, but could be
mitigated by innovations such as the African Peer Review Mechanism of
NEPAD and even more, the recognition, in the AU’s Constitutive Act (AU-CA) of
the ‘right of the Union to intervene in a Member State… in respect of grave
circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’ (AU
2000, article 4(h)). The Rwanda trauma, it seemed, was finding a responsible
African answer in setting a ‘responsibility to protect’ above the preservation of
traditional sovereignty so dear to African states. It is in this context that a new
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), with an African Standby Force
(ASF) as its core piece, was conceived.2
3.2 The African Peace and Security Architecture
If the political impetus for the development of the ASF was carried by the early
2000s winds of change, its basic conceptual and technical underpinnings were
already present in the recommendations of the 2nd meeting of the African
Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS) in Harare in 1997. That meeting recommended
that the OAU (at the time) should endow itself with a capacity for early
response to crisis escalation – before the UN could intervene and whilst
political efforts were made to obtain UN engagement – and foresaw that such a
capacity could be based on standby arrangements with the continent’s five
sub-regions, each providing a brigade-sized contribution (AU 2003). The
meeting also identified the generic requirements of such a force: HQ capacity,
standard operating procedures (SOPs), logistics, training, force generation
capacity, and funding.
Work to implement the vision of the ACDS, however, could only begin in
earnest once the creation of the AU had laid the political conditions. A first step
was the adoption of the ‘Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace
and Security Council of the African Union’ (PSC Protocol), in July 2002 (AU
2002). With that Protocol, Africa endowed itself for the first time with ‘a
standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution
of conflicts’ (Art. 2.1) via a Council of 15 periodically elected member states.
The PSC, the core piece of the APSA, should be supported by the AU
Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, a
Special Fund and the ASF (Art. 2.2).
2 Group discussion at UN Peace Support Team to the AU under Chatham House rules, Addis Ababa,
further on referred to as UN Peace Support Team ‘UN PST, group discussion’.
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3.3 The African Standby Force
As a political document, the PSC Protocol did not go into the detail of what the
ASF should look like. Importantly, however, it did specify that the Force ‘shall
be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military
components in their countries of origin’ (Art. 13.1) and it made clear that the
ASF should enable the AU to respond to a wide range of contingencies from
observation and monitoring missions, to preventive deployments, humanitarian
assistance missions, peace-building operations, and forceful intervention in a
member state in grave circumstances. No political limitations were set a priori
on what the ASF should be called to accomplish.
3.3.1 Policy framework and Roadmap I
Once the political framework had been set, it was left to the ‘technicians’ to
develop the ASF concept. Those technicians, for the most part, were military
officers, and this was reflected in the direction originally taken by the ASF.
Key documents in the conceptual development of the ASF are the Policy
Framework (PF) adopted by the 3rd ACDS in May 2003 (AU 2003), and the
Roadmap of 2005 (Roadmap I), intended to specify the calendar for the
development of the various components of the Force.
The conceptual target, as described in the PF and Roadmap, is set by six
scenarios, which the ASF should gradually be able to master. The scenarios,
and their respective deployment timeframe, are as shown in Table 3.1.
Given the scope of the effort required, the PF and Roadmap divided the
sequencing of ASF operationalisation in two phases. According to the PF, by
June 2005, the AU was to have an HQ capacity to manage scenarios 1 and 2
and a reinforcement system to manage scenario 3 operations, whilst the
regions should have strategic and brigade-level HQs, as well as reinforcement
capacity to manage scenario 4 missions. By the same date the AU should set
up standby rosters of 300–500 military observers (MILOBs) and about 240
individual police officers, as well as a standby system with at least two
company-level formed police units (FPUs). An AU civilian roster including
experts in administration; human rights; humanitarian issues; governance;
disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR); and reconstruction, was
also foreseen for the same date (AU 2003, Sections 3 and 5). The Roadmap
shifted the goal slightly (to June 2006) for some components (AU 2005: paras.
7, 16, 17) but also made clear that civilians were not a phase I priority (AU
2005; Draft 2010 African Union-Vision quoted in AU 2008i: 4).
At the end of phase II, or by June 2010, the PF and Roadmap agreed that the
AU should have HQ capacity to handle complex multidisciplinary PSOs in
difficult environments (scenario 5), whilst the RECs should have improved on
their capacity to deploy scenario 4 missions, in particular their rapid
deployment capability (AU 2003; AU 2005: para. 3). Requirements for further
work in a number of areas were identified and a series of workshops mandated
on: (1) Doctrine; (2) SOPs; (3) Command, Control, Communication and
Information Systems (C³IS); (4) Logistics; (5) Training and Evaluation (AU
2005: Annex B).
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Table 3.1 ASF mission scenarios
Scenario Description Deployment
timeframe
1 AU/Regional military advice to a political mission. 30 days
2 AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with a 30 days
UN mission.
3 Standalone AU/Regional observer mission. 30 days
4 AU/Regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and 30 days
preventive deployment missions (and peace-building).
5 AU Peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional 90 days with the
peacekeeping missions, including those involving military component
low-level spoilers. deploying in 30 days
6 AU Emergency intervention, for instance in the case 14 days in two waves
of genocide, when no other help is available.
Source: African Union (2003: para. 1.6); African Union (2005); Aneme (2008: 1–21).
It was stated in the 1997 ACDS recommendations and reiterated in the PF and
Roadmap that the ASF doctrine, planning procedures, SOPs and training
standards should be based on those of the UN (AU 2003: Annex A; AU 2005:
Section VIII).
3.3.2 Recent developments
Whilst the basic concepts underpinning the ASF stand, a number of
incremental changes have led to important inflexions in its practical
implementation in the recent past. Important building blocks have been the
2006 Policy Framework on the Civilian Dimension (CP Framework), which also
includes police (AU 2006a), and some of the doctrinal work done in the context
of the Workshops mandated by Roadmap I. Both the CP Framework and
Chapter 7 of the ASF Doctrine are directly inspired from UN work to develop
guidance for integrated missions and an Integrated Mission Planning Process
(United Nations 2006a, 2006b). A trend away from the exclusive focus on the
military dimension toward increasing attention to the multidimensional character
of the ASF, both at the strategic and operational levels, thus became clear (De
Coning 2007).
As a result, the 2nd meeting of African Defence Ministers in March 2008
pledged to ‘ensure that the civilian and police/gendarmerie components of the
ASF receive an appropriate degree of attention in order to guarantee a balance
in the development of the different components’ (AU 2008c).
On the back of that ministerial meeting ‘Roadmap II’ was adopted in July 2008
setting out the tasks to be accomplished during the short two years up to the
deadline for full ASF operationalisation. Those included further work on HQ
capacity, decision-making and mandate issues, logistics depots, strategic lift,
3 For details see Section 5.1.
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the rapid deployment capacity (RDC), and accelerated efforts to develop the
civilian and police dimensions (AU 2008g).
Efforts were indeed undertaken between late 2008 and early 2010 to speed up
the conceptual development, set standards and identify practical solutions on
the police and civilian dimensions (AU 2010b), on the RDC, and on some
specific areas such as health, logistics, and legal requirements.3 Preparation
for the ‘Amani-Africa’ 2010 command post exercise (CPX) created an additional
incentive to accelerate work on the police and civilian dimensions: the so-called
‘Carana scenario’ underpinning the exercise is a full-blown ‘scenario 4+’ type of
operation; in other words, a complex PSO including stabilisation and peace
consolidation (Amani-Africa Cycle 2009a, 2009b).
Crowning a series of field training exercises (FTX) conducted at the regional
level, ‘Amani Africa’ was an important milestone in taking stock of
achievements in building the ASF. The Amani CPX was meant to test the
planning, command, control, and communication capability of AU and REC staff
and the AU’s decision-making process at the politico-strategic level.
Originally intended as an ASF certification exercise, ‘Amani Africa’ was de facto
gradually reengineered as a step in a longer process because it appeared in
the course of its preparation over 2008 and 2009 that the ASF 2010 target was
too ambitious. Indeed, the conclusion of the exercise evaluation report that the
ASF was not yet operational, missing key capacity in the planning and conduct
of PSOs at strategic and operational HQ levels, was a surprise to none (AU
2010b). Taking stock at its December 2010 meeting, the ministerial-level
Specialised Committee on Defence, Safety, and Security ‘[exhorted] the
commission... to fill the gaps identified in the “Amani Africa” exercise evaluation
report’ (AU 2010a: para. 7, author’s translation). At the same meeting the
ministers formulated recommendations for the finalisation of Roadmap III,
explicitly setting a new deadline of 2015 for the full operationalisation of the
ASF (AU 2010a: paras. 5b, 7t).
3.4 Donor response
Western responses to pre-2000 African initiatives to undertake PSOs were
reserved as there were no ‘good’ models to support, although bilateral
assistance was provided on the basis of traditional loyalties (Sections 4 and 7).
Matters evolved quickly, however, on the basis of the new African commitments
enshrined in the AU-CA, NEPAD and the PSC Protocol.
As of 2002, for four years in a row, Africa was a key item on the agenda of the
G8 (g8italia2009 2009). Thus in Kananaskis (Canada) in 2002, G8 leaders
adopted the ‘Africa Action Plan’ as a collective response to the NEPAD
initiative. The Plan included the provision of technical and financial assistance
to African countries and regional organisations to help them develop conflict
prevention capacities. At Evian (France) in 2003, G8 members reinforced their
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support, but targeted it more directly towards African military capacity-building.
A year later, at Sea Island (USA) the G8 expanded on this commitment,
including pledges to support the development of logistical and transportation
arrangements, police training and the training of 75,000 troops worldwide –
whereby it was unclear what proportion of the total would be African (Powell
2005: 25ff).
Moving beyond traditional units and officer training, partners also began
engaging at the time in massive technical assistance efforts to support the
conceptual development of the ASF and to underpin African capacity-building
via comprehensive research and training programmes carried out in a range of
Peacekeeping Training Centres (PTCs). It was when, for example, the five core
ASF conceptual workshops underpinning the ASF were held, and when
partners resolutely threw their weight behind the birth and growth of the West
African Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC).4
Once it became clear that the Africans were willing to engage in difficult crisis
management in the field, donor support to operations also became more
readily available. A real ‘breakthrough’ in material support was represented by
the launch of the EU African Peace Facility (APF) in 2004, from funds earlier
earmarked for development aid. The second round of the APF, covering the
period 2008–2013, was later endorsed by the 10th European Development
Fund, again proving major financial support. Other donors, such as Canada
and the US, would also be forthcoming (Section 7).
4 Lessons learned from
African PSOs
There is a wide literature covering lessons learned from African PSOs since
they were first initiated by ECOMOG, the ECOWAS force, in the early 1990s.
For some, ECOWAS operations ‘eloquently demonstrated that African states
can maintain peace and security on their continent’ (Ero 1999: 55–74).5
However, the bulk of the literature bearing on ECOWAS and subsequent
operations from the AU and other sub-regional organisations, demonstrates
that African PSOs have been beset by recurrent problems linked to insufficient
strategic and operational management and coordination, poor logistics, lack of
funding, breakdowns of conduct and discipline, and occasional political
quarrels about their legitimacy (Aboagye 2004, 2008; Aning 1999: 75–96; Aning
2004: 533–42; Berman 2002a; Berman 2002b; Berman 2003: 199–214;
Berman 2004: 27–32; Berman and Sams 2000; Boshoff 2003a: 41–4; Boshoff
2003b; Cilliers 1999; Daniel 2008; Franke 2006; Guicherd 2007; Howe 1996;
4 For details, see Sections 5.1 and 5.3 respectively.
5 Salim Ahmed Salim, quoted by Ero.
6 2,700 out of the authorised strength of 3,335.
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Hutchful 1999: 97–117; Khobe 2000; Mtimkulu 2005; Murithi 2007; Olonisakin
1997; Olukoshi 1996: 563–76; Patel et al. 2004; Pitts 1999; Sesay 1989; Tuck
2000; UN 2005a; Vogt 1992; Williams 2006).
The twin weaknesses of lack of funding and poor logistical capacity
characterise every single African PSO, with two possible outcomes: either the
planned operation has to be scaled down, or it can only be undertaken with
massive assistance from international partners. During its first ECOMOG
operation in Liberia (1990), for instance, ECOWAS could not honour
agreements to support the troops after the first month (Berman and Sams
2000: 106; Pitts 1999). Consequently some troop-contributing countries (TCCs)
had to bring their contingents home prematurely (Olonisakin 1997: 363).
Basically, ‘[t]here was no logistic capacity… except for what external partners
could provide’ (Malan 2008: 93).
In 2003, ECOWAS’s ECOMICI deployment (Côte d’Ivoire), which was
supposed to anticipate a UN deployment, was hampered by financial difficulties
that delayed the operation for two months. It took another three months to set
up a force HQ that still lacked vehicles and appropriate rooms. Even more
importantly, ECOWAS proved unable to raise more than 1,500 of the 2,386
authorised troops, leading to the UN Security Council decision to authorise
France to deploy a 4,000-strong troop force (Operation Licorne), which took
over the lion’s share of patrolling the ceasefire line (Gberie and Addo 2004).
The €15 million funding for one year of ECOMICI was raised from France and
minor contributions from eight other European countries.
A fairly similar situation has been encountered elsewhere. Although described
as ‘the first operation wholly initiated, planned and executed by AU members’
(Murithi 2007: 75), AMIB, the AU mission in Burundi, ‘would have been virtually
impossible to establish’ without the scale and flexibility of external support
(US$12 million from the US and UK combined) (Aboagye 2004: 13; Cilliers
2005; Mackie et al. 2006: 10). Like in the Western African PSOs, funding
problems hindered force generation and the mission remained much below its
approved strength (Boshoff 2003a: 44ff).6 The follow-up UN mission, ONUB,
with considerably more staff, and an annual budget of about US$330 million,
was ‘significantly beyond Africa’s resources’ (Aboagye 2004: 13; Cilliers 2005).
Operations undertaken in Central Africa fared even less well. In 1997 MISAB in
the Central African Republic (CAR), an ad hoc operation authorised by a group
of francophone states, was entirely dependent on France, which organised the
deployment of all forces, provided logistics and paid for all food and
allowances, fuel, and housing (Landsberg 1999: 46; Feitz 2002: 109ff). The
same year a Stabilisation Force for the Republic of Congo never materialised
because no country emerged ‘able and willing to assure the command and
control or [had] the ability to generate the necessary financing’ (Berman and
Sams 1998; Kofi Annan quoted by Berman and Sams 2000: 230). It is only in
2002 that the Central Africans were able to undertake an autonomous
7 Chadian troops in CAR have been accused of rape, for example (interview, technical assistant,
Libreville, May 2009).
8 For instance, it is well known that the Chadian troops of MICOPAX in the CAR are not neutral.
9 Part of the military structure handling relations with civilians – civil-military cooperation.
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operation, FOMUC, with heavy support from the French, and then the EU
(FOMUC 2008).
Conduct and discipline issues seriously marred the reputation of ECOMOG in
the early years. In ECOMOG’s first Liberia mission, Nigerian troops became
‘notorious for… human rights abuses’ and theft (Ero 1999: 55–74), neutralising
the otherwise positive effects of the operation. This was unfortunately repeated
with widespread stealing, indiscriminate violence against alleged rebels and
civilians, and trade in ‘blood diamonds’ by ECOMOG soldiers in Sierra Leone
(Ero 1999: 65). Occurrences of troop misbehaviour seem to have been much
less frequent in subsequent African PSOs – presumably the result of combined
efforts by TCCs and donors to stress troop discipline and ethics in training
programmes – although they have not disappeared entirely.7
Political partisanship, a burden that affected many African actual or would-be
PSOs, and had repercussions in the field (such as Nigerian peacekeepers
taking sides between warring factions in Liberia and Sierra Leone) (Berman
and Sams 2000: 106ff, 178), has largely disappeared, as the AU and RECs
have become stronger and PSOs are increasingly led by institutions rather
than regional hegemons. The development of AU and sub-regional conflict
resolution mechanisms has undoubtedly played a role (Berman 2002a: 34;
Shearer 1999). However, it has not eliminated all temptations of political
interference (Meyer 2009: 163–6).8
Some 15 years after Africans began to undertake their first PSOs, the balance
of strengths and weaknesses is well-established. An assessment of AMIS, the
AU mission in Sudan some two years into its deployment, summarises
common shortcomings: insufficient planning before and during the mission; lack
of communication and interoperability between military, police, and civilians;
weaknesses in administrative, financial and human resources management;
absence of a functioning CIMIC9 capable to handle contacts with the political
environment; absence of reliable logistical support and the ability to handle
logistics; and finally, total dependence on external donors in terms of funding
and technical advice (Guicherd 2007).
It is toward the mitigation of those weaknesses that African and partner efforts
are directed.
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5 The current state of the ASF
Much headway has been made in the development of the ASF since the first
Roadmap (2005). Three years later, in mid-2008, Roadmap II contained a table
assessing achievements. An update compiled by this author in December 2010
is presented below (updated boxes in italics):
Table 5.1 ASF achievements end of 2010
Achievements The five regional brigades
EASBRIG FOMAC ECOBRIG NASBRIG SADCBRIG
East Africa Central Africa West Africa North Africa South Africa
Framework Done Done Done Done Done
Documents
Memorandum Done Done Done Done Done
of Under-
standing
Planning Done Done Done Ongoing Done
elements
Brigade HQs Done Decided Done Ongoing Decided
against against
Pledged Units MoU on troop MoU pending, MoU pending, MoU pending MoU pending,
allocation ‘force 6,200 unspecified
pending,1 catalogue’ unspecified troops
5,500 troops of 4,800 troops pledged pledged by
pledged by troops by member member
member presented by states states
states member
states
Civilian Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing
Components
Centres of Done Ongoing Done Done
Excellence
Standby Rosters Delegated to Ongoing
AFDEM2
Notes:
1) Not identical with the MoU on the establishment of the ASF (see row two of this table);
2) African Civilian Standby Roster for Humanitarian and Peace Building Missions.
This table, however, requires a number of comments.
10 It was decided in the Dar es Salaam workshop that the establishment of the civilian roster would be
externalised for three years until responsibility was transferred back to the AU and RECs (AU 2010b:
para. VIII (2–5).
11 As proposed by the FSF Police Harmonisation Workshop Addis Ababa 11–13 February 2009.
12 APSTA (African Peace Support Trainers Association) (undated), Appendix B.
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5.1 Conceptual developments
Thanks to a series of continental workshops held in 2005 and 2006, the basic
common conceptual core of the ASF doctrine, SOPs, C³IS, logistics, training
and evaluation has been established, and was later endorsed by African
Defence Ministers (AU 2008c).
However, because these documents were drafted at a time when the civilian
and police dimensions were still underdeveloped (AU 2008b, 2008i, 2009c),
further adjustments were undertaken – for the civilian component – during
workshops in Kampala in July 2008 and Dar es Salaam in July 2009 (AU
2009f, 2010b: para. VIII 2–5).10 Not only was it decided that both the AU and
each REC should establish a civilian PLANELM (planning element) of four
staff, but it was also agreed that the civilian components should number
approximately 60 staff, thus requiring the development of a civilian standby
roster of approximately three hundred civilian specialists.11 The police
component was further developed at a series of joint workshops of the
AU/RECs Police PLANELMs (Algiers, October 2008; Gaborone, July 2009;
Nairobi, March 2010) (AU 2008j). This led to a significant overhaul, and
extension, of the concept. Whereas the police component had originally been
developed as a civilian element of the ASF (AU 2006a), it eventually evolved
into a two-pronged structure including both individual police (240 per brigade)
and Formed Police Units (two company-level units per brigade). As the latter
are mostly paramilitary in character (gendarmerie), the Police SOPs are
surprisingly detailed with regard to the use of firearms (including 80 AK47
assault guns, and 10 pump action guns) for a standard police component.12
Concurrently, the Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) has moved into focus,
with the ambitious goal of achieving two independent, multidimensional RDC
units of 2,500 men/women each on readiness at any given time by 2012 (AU
2009e, 2010b ‘Key RDC Features’: para. 16).
To frame the ASF development in the continental context, a protocol of
agreement setting out respective responsibilities and consultation mechanisms
between the AU and the RECs has been signed in January 2008 (AU 2007,
2008h), but its implementation, in particular in crisis situations involving actual
deployment, requires further political discussions as there is no well-oiled
consultation process between the PSC and the sub-regional crisis management
mechanisms. The lack of a Memorandum of Understanding on the earmarking
of units to serve at the AU’s request was highlighted by the Amani evaluation
report (AU 2010b: para. 24a).13
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Table 5.2 Rapid Deployment Capability readiness
Year Training Standby Out of cycle
1 Jan–Jun SASF1 EASF NASF
CASF ESF
Jul–Dec NASF2 SASF ESF
EASF CASF
2 Jan–Jun ESF3 NASF CASF
SASF EASF
Jul–Dec CASF4 EASF EASF
NASF SASF
3 Jan–Jun EASF5 CASF SASF
ESF NASF
Jul–Dec SASF EASF NASF
CASF ESF
Source: AU (2010b)
Notes: (1) SADC (Southern African Development Community) Brigade; (2) North African Brigade;
(3) Ecowas Brigade; (4) Central African Brigade; (5) East African Brigade
5.2 Headquarters capacity
The ASF Policy Framework foresaw the establishment of a 15-staff planning
element (PLANELM) at the AU and each of the RECs (Institute for Security
Studies 2004: 4). This was accomplished as foreseen during phase I of the
Roadmap, and PLANELMs are now in place at the AU and in all RECs or
Regional Mechanisms (RMs), or, as in the case of NASBRIG, in preparation.
The requirement for brigade HQs was fulfilled with the exception of two
brigades, SADCBRIG and FOMAC, which deliberately decided against them for
a variety of reasons, including high costs (Institute for Security Studies
2004: 6).
The setting up of PLANELMs required the overcoming of a number of
institutional and political difficulties, such as in the East African region, where
the development of EASBRIG was disjointed from the existing REC
(Intergovernmental Authority for Development – IGAD) and entrusted to an ad
hoc Coordination Mechanism (EASBRIGCOM) in March 2007 (EASBRIGCOM
2009). Both EASBRIGCOM and the already existing EASBRIG PLANELM are
located in Karen, Kenya, whereas the brigade HQ and its logistic base will be
located in Addis Ababa. Even more difficult political problems have hindered
the development of NASBRIG as Morocco’s absence from the AU makes it
13 For the Amani cycle see www.amaniafricacycle.org.
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impossible for the North African REC, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), to serve
as framework for a continental project, and Egypt, a major military power, is not
a member of the AMU. As a result, only in December 2008 did the Northern
African Chiefs of Defence Staff agree to set up a brigade, which will be
headquartered in Cairo, whereas the secretariat of the regional mechanism will
go to Tripoli.14
The question remains open whether those PLANELMs/brigade HQs have the
capacity to carry out the planning, command and control of operations, since
the quality and quantity of staff remains insufficient almost everywhere. A 15-
member PLANELM may be reasonable for a REC for the purpose of capacity-
building, especially if it is doubled by a brigade HQ, but it is certainly
insufficient for the AU, which has to be the conceptual and organisational
driving force for continental capacity-building efforts and has undertaken two
extremely challenging missions, AMIS and AMISOM, over the same period. In
practice, operational pressures on long-term planning and development fell
victim to operational necessities as staff became overstretched once the
decision to set up the ASF was endorsed in the Policy Framework
(Ramsbotham et al. 2005a: 334). With a much lighter burden, ECCAS, the only
REC currently leading a PSO, is finding it similarly difficult both to manage its
capacity-development programme and discharge its operational duties.15
Lack of staff to plan and oversee operations explains why the management of
AMIS in 2004 could not be entrusted to the AU’s Peace Support Operations
Division (PSOD), but required the establishment of an ad hoc structure, the
Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF), which operated only with significant
technical (and financial) assistance from the UN and major donors (AU 2004b;
Klingebiel 2006: 53, 65). Likewise, it is the United Nations Support Office for
AMISOM (UNSOA) in Nairobi that does much of the work of managing
AMISOM. At this point neither the AU nor the RECs are appropriately staffed to
develop the ASF as a multinational tool. The AU PSOD only recently hired
three police staff, and ECCAS has only two officers and EASBRIG only one
officer in charge of developing the police component.16 The latter was the first
REC to hire an expert to manage the Civilian Component in 2008,17 with the AU
following, and ECCAS had only one full-time, and one part-time person by
October 2009. The heavy dominance of the military at HQ level was one of the
issues raised by the Amani evaluation report as deserving urgent corrective
action (AU 2010b, ‘Amani Evaluation Report’: para. 17). More globally, the
exercise highlighted the many shortcomings the AU and RECs would have to
remedy in order to efficiently carry out the planning and conduct of any
operation. Extensions of the Amani cycle (an ‘Amani two’, and ‘Amani three’)
were suggested (AU 2010b, ‘Draft Roadmap III, Introduction’: para. 2).
14 Interview, French military representative, Paris, March 2009.
15 Interview, French military adviser, Libreville, June 2009.
16 Telephone interview, UK security adviser, Addis Ababa.
17 Email exchange with Head of Research IPSTC, Karen, June 2009.
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Lack of staff at the POSD is not a money issue, as funds have been made
available by donors. The EU had already agreed in 2004 to finance 40
positions at the PSOD. By the end of 2008, only 11 positions had been filled
(Africa and Europe in Partnership 2009: 6). In 2007, the EU further agreed to
finance a ‘Strategic Planning Management Unit’ (SPMC) via another budget
line, the Stability Instrument. The SPMC would represent a boost of 34
additional staff dedicated to the management of AMISOM (AMISOM 2009).
However, by April 2009 only five staff had been recruited.18 Hiring problems at
the AU have long been pinpointed (High Level Panel 2007: para. 129–45), but
they seem difficult to overcome for a combination of reasons ranging from
political bias, through heavily centralised decision-making, to lack of technical
capacity to manage human resources, to competition with better-paying UN
agencies (High Level Panel 2007: para. 129–45). The post of Head of the ASF
at the AU has remained vacant since the death of General Hassan in 2006.
However, the position of High Representative for the Operationalisation of the
ASF was created in late 2010 but this seems to have responded to a political,
rather than technical requirement (AU 2010a: para. 7w).19
HQ shortcomings are aggravated by the fact that not enough attention is being
paid to administrative and financial management capacity. This hinders the
ability of the AU and the RECs to absorb donations for capacity-building, but
becomes a serious handicap for the management of operations and donor
support to these operations. Donors consequently seek ways around this: for
example, the US mainly provides contributions in kind, directly or via third
parties; EU support for FOMUC and later MICOPAX is managed by a financial
cell entrusted to the French military in Bangui;20 and Japan prefers to pay a 13
per cent administrative fee to the UN to manage its support to the AU, as this
is considered less risky.21
5.3 Training centres
Peacekeeping training centres (PTCs) have been established or developed in
Africa since the mid-1990s, largely thanks to massive donors’ financial and
technical assistance. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, Denmark and,
more recently, Canada, have been major sponsors. Some of those centres,
such as the well-known Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
(KAIPTC) in Accra, have been created specifically to serve the needs of the
ASF; others are national institutions being rededicated or expanded for the
same purpose (several French-sponsored training institutions becoming ‘Écoles
Nationales à Vocation Régionale’ (ENVR); British-sponsored IPSTC in Kenya,
or the Nigerian War College (ACSRS) etc.). Africa is therefore now endowed
18 Interview, PSOD official, Addis Ababa.
19 The position was allocated to General Konaté of Guinea, perhaps to help boast the ASF politically but
also as a reward for his deft handling of the political transition in his country.
20 Interview, French military adviser, Libreville, June 2009.
21 Interview, senior Japanese civil servant, Addis Ababa.
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Table 5.3 Training centres22
Curricula Training centres per region
North East West Central South
Strategic CCTCRPA IPSTC ACSRS CSID RPTC
Operational KAIPTC EEML PMTC
Tactical EMP EFOFAC RPTC
Police IPSTC+RPA KAIPTC EIFORCES ILEA
Civilian IPCS LECIA ACCORD
Engineers EGT
Medicine CEOMP EASS
De-mining IMATC CPADD
with a wide network of PTCs, the curricula of which encompass in principle the
whole breadth of skills necessary to plan and run the ASF (Isturiz 2005: 78,
83).
With this range of PTCs, Africa theoretically has the potential to build the
military and civilian staff required to operate the ASF both at HQs and in the
field. This potential, however, is not fully realised as PTCs are a patchwork
rather than a coherent network. Too often the curricula offered remain the ‘pet
projects’ of various donors, who support them according to their national
interests and preferences, rather than being oriented by a coherent AU or REC
training plan.23 The inconsistency of the programmes tends to be greater in
regions where PTCs have been in existence longer than the AU/REC staff. This
is particularly the case in ECOWAS, where KAIPTC has been a ‘favourite’ of
several donors for some time (UK, Germany) and the EMP Koulikoro/Bamako
school in Mali, which has received much attention from the French and
Canadians. As donors’ priorities evolve and coordination between them is low,
the level of overall coherence between PTCs stalls. In West Africa the original
agreement, largely at US, UK and French instigation, that there would be a
‘division of labour’ among the EMP Koulikoro/Bamako, KAIPTC and ACSRS
respectively to assume tactical, operational and strategic training (Guillard
2007), has largely become moot. As the EMP Bamako has been adding
operational level, and civilian component and police training to its curriculum,
its course offers today differentiate it from that of KAIPTC mainly via the
language of delivery – French (although EMP Bamako has also started
introducing courses in English). Given the dearth of French-speaking
peacekeepers around the world this is nevertheless a valuable contribution.24
22 Compiled from various sources; see Acronyms.
23 Interview, EU Commission official, Addis Ababa.
24 Interview, French military official, Addis Ababa.
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25 The latest such meeting took place in Harare, 9–10 December 2010.
26 APSTA ‘has been funded 100% by donors from its inception’. It now faces funding uncertainties for its
planned activities and recruitment; see AU-PSOD (2010).
27 Meanwhile the AU standard police unit is 240 officers.
28 Interview, Canadian official, Addis Ababa.
29 According to a senior EU representative, in early 2011, as many as 12 donors were supporting
EASBRIG, including nine EU member states; presentation at the first meeting of training services in
the ECCAS region, Libreville, 8–10 February 2011.
Efforts are underway at the AU, with the intellectual support of the African
Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA) and the political and financial
backing of some donors, to try to instil coherence into the PTC’s programmes,
so that they better serve ASF training needs. A joint training programming
session is held in principle on a yearly basis with all the RECs under AU
auspices (AU 2008f).25 Joint EU/AU, and Pearson Centre/University of Toronto
expert missions toured the continent in April and May 2009 in order to better
tailor future support for the PTCs to the needs of the AU and the RECs. This
led, in the case of the EU, to the decision to support financially a number of
PTCs assessed to be particularly suitable for ASF needs (AU/EU 2010).
Whether these efforts will also increase Africa’s ownership of ASF training
remains debatable. Deprived of autonomous African funding, lacking leadership
and members’ commitment, and poorly accepted in some regions (for example
Central Africa), APSTA has proved unable to provide the expected conceptual
leadership (AU-PSOD 2010).26 Meanwhile the intellectual input of the AU and
RECs in setting up PTC programmes remains limited and the PTCs mostly
externally financed.
5.4 Units identification and preparedness
According to the table annexed to Roadmap II (see introduction, Section 5), all
RECs have identified the units that must compose their regional brigade. Of the
6,500 personnel that must constitute ECOBRIG, 6,200 have already been
confirmed by member states; they are reportedly ready, deployable within 90
days and capable to sustain 90 days of operation (Data in this section from AU
2008e; also Kinzel 2008). A planned RDC of about 2,770 soldiers – as part of
the brigade – deployable within 14 days is not yet operational, as work on the
RDC generally only started gathering pace in April 2009 (AU 2009d).27 A tiny
number of police will be included in the brigade – the result of much lobbying
from Canada.28 EASBRIG, like ECOBRIG a favourite of international donors,29
has made much headway recently despite the early difficulties linked to its
institutional anchoring. The brigade will have 5,500 military and civilian
personnel and include a police component of 48 officers (Levine 2008: 23–6).
EASBRIG, SADCBRIG and ECOBRIG conducted their command post and field
exercises in 2009 (Dersso 2010: 13ff). The decision to create the SADCBRIG,
including a police component, was made in 2004 and units were pledged by
August 2007. ECCAS has been catching up rapidly since 2007: member states
have identified the units composing FOMAC, which should have 4,800
30 Interview, French military official, Addis Ababa.
31 Interviews with several Western military personnel.
32 With the major contributors being: Benin (878 troops), Burkina (803 troops), Ethiopia (2,274 troops),
Ghana (2,569 troops), Kenya (801 troops), Nigeria (4,888 troops), Rwanda (3,490 troops), Senegal
(1,532 troops), South Africa (2,006 troops), Togo (516 troops), Zambia (552 troops);
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml.
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personnel; more recently FPUs have also been earmarked by Angola,
Cameroon, Gabon, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Chad.
Some operational experience was gained during the small-scale operation
MICOPAX in the CAR, and the command post and field training exercise
‘Kwanza’ in 2010. Evaluations of ASF field exercises were, according to press
releases, generally a success (Le Phare 2010; for SADC see Mandrup 2009;
for EASBRIG see AFRICOM 2009b). Because of its late start described above,
NASBRIG is not yet reality. However, according to a competent observer, if ‘the
North Africans decide today to set up a brigade they will quickly succeed
because they have the most professional and best equipped forces in Africa’.30
Countries pledging troops and officers are a mark of political commitment. It is
not yet a guarantee of force effectiveness. Western trainers have often
confirmed the heavy task they face in providing African units with the most
basic training in discipline, and even marksmanship before they can think of
transforming a unit into peacekeepers.31 There is also the question of the
collective performance of the African military. Apart from a few nations (Nigeria,
Angola, South Africa, Ethiopia, and nowadays, Rwanda) African armed forces
do not have the capacity to perform complex military operations (Meinken
2005: 6; Schmidt 2007: 1050). Few have the experience of warfare against
other nations’ armies and apart from Angola, none has ever succeeded in
overcoming internal armed resistance (Kinzel 2008; Meinken 2005: 5; Clayton
2001: 51–68). The current example of the FARDC’s (Armed Forces of the
DRC) inability to neutralise the FDLR (Forces démocratiques de libération du
Rwanda) Hutu forces in eastern Congo is a patent example. The overall
challenge was perceptively noted by Jakkie Cilliers who remarked in 1999 that
it was from soldiers ‘ill-equipped, poorly trained by international peacekeeping
standards, poorly led, often elitist, prone to intervention in the domestic political
affairs of their country’, that the ASF will be made (Cilliers 1999: 133–53). Still,
there has been some progress in the professionalisation of African armies. If
acceptance for service in a UN operation is taken as a standard, as many as
18 sub-Saharan countries qualified in early 2011 (compared to 12 in mid-2001),
providing a total of more than 21,500 UN peacekeepers.32
African police do not fare better than the military. A 2000 survey by the
Ghanaian Government found out that ‘police were among the least trusted,
least effective, and most corrupt of government institutions’ (Werlin 2005: 521).
More recent findings from other countries confirm the picture (Swain 2009).
Indeed, the police themselves in sub-Saharan countries perceive their role as
being ‘a means of coercion’.33 This is a poor base on which to build a police
force whose primary mission will be to restore human security in a post-conflict
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33 UNPST, group discussion.
34 Interview, senior EU official, Brussels (all interviews in Brussels in March 2009).
35 UNPST, group discussion.
36 Conversation with retired SA officer, Kinshasa, October 2008.
37 Interview, US military adviser, Libreville, February 2009.
38 As occurred during post-independence mutinies in Gabon, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.
39 After the crash of the second one on 27 August 2009.
40 Interview, French military representative, Paris, March 2009.
environment. The fact that in a number of African countries (in particular those
with a French and Belgian colonial background) the police and the military are
trained and equipped alike, does not improve the situation (ECCAS-CEEAC
2009: 17).34
This task, however, is not impossible. Advisers involved in police PSO training
have observed the enormous positive potential resulting from such training and
deployment in terms of lifting standards of policing to internationally acceptable
levels.35 Training, inclusion in a structured environment, and decent pay seem
to be the combined keys to this success.
5.5 Logistics
As lessons from past African PSOs have demonstrated, African armies have
notoriously weak logistics capabilities. A 1997 US government study concluded
that five out of 20 African armies had none at all; another eight had logistics
networks that could not even support company-level units beyond their
barracks, and six (small) states had limited battalion-level capabilities to
perform within their home state (Neethling 1999: 39). Exceptions to this pattern
are basically limited to Egypt, Nigeria, Angola and South Africa (see
International Institute for Strategic Studies 2009; DFI International 1997: Annex
G: 413–58) – although in South Africa, the loss of trained staff and heavy
decommissioning of material during the 1994 transition of the South African
Defence Force to the South African National Defence Force took its toll.36 This
lack of logistic capability directly results from the fact that most African armies
have not been set up to confront external threats, but rather to deal with
internal stability concerns.37 It also reflects the reality that most African states
relied upon foreign intervention to protect their sovereignty and external
security during two or three post-independence decades – including at times
against their own national armies.38
The lack of national logistics reflects on the capability of the ASF (Dersso
2009). A few of the brigades do have some lift capacity: SADCBRIG, thanks to
the South African military, can offer helicopters and aerial transport. FOMAC
can rely on one Iliushin 76 from Angola,39 one Hercules C130 each from Gabon
and Cameroon, and a unit of three helicopters (ECCAS-CEEAC 2008: Art. 1,
4). NASBRIG has at least a helicopter squadron.40 Overall, the AU still has to
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41 Douala for ECCAS; Gaborone for SADCBRIG; Hastings for ECOBRIG; and ‘Ethiopia’ for EASBRIG.
42 Interview, Western military adviser, Libreville, June 2009.
43 Author’s translation.
44 The budget for 1 May 2007 to 30 June 2009 amounted to some US$77.79 million. Proposed
commitment authority for 1 July to 31 December 2009 amounted to US$185.67 million.
develop a Strategic Lift concept, but not much headway seems to have been
made in that direction (AU 2009b).
Regarding basic mission logistics needs, the AU and RECs have launched
work into logistics depots as a way to overcome their well-known shortcomings.
This effort, however, does not seem to have gone much beyond studies to
identify the appropriate locations of the depots (AU 2010a: para. 7p)41 and
initial drafts of their contents and costs (AU 2008e).42 Following protracted
studies and political discussions, the decision to create a continental depot in
Douala, Cameroon, was finally approved by the defence and security ministers
in December 2010 (AU 2009b: para. 7; AU 2010b: para. V.1).
5.6 Funding
As progress is being made in a variety of areas, there is increasing awareness
in AU and REC circles that the lack of funding remains a major obstacle to
progress and, even more, to African ownership. In January 2008, senior
officials from the AU and RECs underlined the severity of the predicament:
‘Examining the constraints weighing on our efforts, we have noted that funding
is one of the greatest difficulties confronting the AU and Regional Mechanisms.
Our organisations rely almost exclusively on resources provided by our
partners’ (AU 2008h: 4).43
Echoing this concern, the African Defence and Security Ministers appealed in
March 2008 to African states to contribute more significantly to financing the
activities undertaken by the AU and RECs for peace and security (AU 2008c:
para. IX.1), an appeal they reiterated in December 2010 (AU 2010a).
Meanwhile, solutions involving the international community on a more
permanent basis are being sought. In March 2009, a high-level commission
(the so-called ‘Prodi Panel’) mandated by the Security Council proposed to
extend the benefits of UN-assessed funding to the AU, and to create a multi-
donor trust fund to support long-term tasks like capacity-building, conflict
prevention and institution building (Prodi 2008). The proposal to use UN-
assessed funding has not been accepted, but ad hoc solutions involving an
ever greater technical and financial contribution from external sources are
more and more implemented: UNAMID and AMISOM are examples. AMISOM’s
is funded by the UN, the USA, the United Kingdom, Kenya, Italy, the EU,
Sweden, China and the League of Arab States (United Nations 2009b; Hull and
Svensson 2008).44 MICOPAX, the ECCAS mission in the CAR, is receives
50 per cent of its financing from the EU, and 30 per cent from France.
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In this context, it is extremely difficult to see how the contemplated RDC can
become reality. Taking the EU battle groups (1,500 personnel each) as a
benchmark can help measure the scope of the problem: Sweden, for its part,
had calculated the costs for a six-month standby period at €38 million, and for
a deployment period of its battle group at €168 million (Lindstrom 2007: 24).
With 2,500 personnel an RDC would be even more costly.
5.7 Summary
In sum, many of the weaknesses of former African PSOs have been, or are
being addressed. PLANELMs are in place or being established in all RECs and
the AU. The PSOD is being reinforced so that PSOs can be prepared and led
in a more organised fashion. Agreements have been signed and crisis
management mechanisms put in place, hopefully making ad hoc PSOs with
debatable political legitimacy a thing of the past. A network of PTCs is being
beefed up. Brigade units and staff are being identified – albeit with greater
progress in the military than in the police and civilian fields. On the other hand,
brigade operational capacity remains largely untested and could yet be
frustrated by many difficulties, including lack of appropriate logistics and officer
skills. Political decision-making procedures, strategic management, and
operational capabilities lag behind, as ever more developments point to an
increasingly complex concept of the ASF. Funding remains an entirely
unresolved problem.
6 The ASF: A moving target
As the efforts just described demonstrate, the ASF is slowly becoming reality. It
is clear, however, from recent conceptual work and recent and ongoing
operations (AMIS, AMISOM, MICOPAX) that the AU’s and RECs’ aims are now
pitched at the upper end of the scale of scenarios developed in the original
Roadmap. An upward trend is visible in three directions:
 from the ‘fire brigade’ type of operation carried out by an agile, relatively
unsophisticated ASF nipping the crisis in the bud before the UN takes over,
to scenarios where Africans themselves assume peace consolidation tasks
over the long run;
 from mainly military to multidimensional missions endowed with the whole
range of civilian and police components;
 from low-risk deployments in relatively peaceful contexts to operations in
environments with a high level of ‘spoilers’.
Recent developments confuse the picture further, rather than clarify it. Thus,
the RDC concept, which has now been placed upfront in the list of priorities,
combines quick reaction and multidimensionality. New tasks have also
appeared on the list of possible ASF commitments, including disaster relief and
naval operations (AU 2010b, ‘Draft ASF Roadmap III’: para. c4). On the other
hand, operations like UNAMID and AMISOM tend to confirm the conclusion of
a recent study by a leading expert that
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if an ASF mission is to have a durable impact for the establishment of
peace and stability in the host country, it will have to be deployed for a
period of not less than five years, which is the average length of a mission.
(Dersso 2010: 8)
A large operation of the size of MONUSCO in the DRC could easily bind the
whole ASF for years, leaving no operational reserves for a second ASF
mission.
No open debate, however, has been carried out on those evolving
assumptions, their political underpinnings or feasibility requirements.45 The
ASF, therefore, is a moving target, ‘built on a swamp of non-addressed issues
and high expectations’, as a veteran observer and player puts it.46 This is
probably why draft Roadmap III identifies the need to review the six original
scenarios underpinning the ASF as part of a more current ‘ASF vision’ (AU
2010b: para. 10b).
This gradual and unspoken shift in assumptions has two main consequences
for donor support. First, it leads to misunderstandings, between Africans and
partners, among the partners themselves, and sometimes within the services
of a single nation. For example, whilst EU representatives argue that
multidimensionality is a demand from the African side of the partnership, at
least some PSOD representatives see pressure from Western partners behind
the drive for multidimensionality. Some German voices are recorded as saying
that the ASF remains a ‘mostly military project’,47 although the Germans are
one of the main sources of assistance to the police component of the ASF! A
representative of Japan interviewed in Addis Ababa expressed the view that
the ASF should be a ‘fire brigade’ in times of crisis, although Japan itself
cannot directly support the ASF military build-up.48 Overall, though, partners
are wary of taking normative positions as this is perceived as too delicate
politically. It is only a minority of independent analysts who dare state clearly
that ASF ambitions may be beyond Africa’s means, at least in the short term
(Guicherd 2007: 21–3; Klingebiel 2006: 54). At most, partners may point to the
difficulty of integrating civilian, police and military components in African PSOs,
even if this would theoretically produce better results.49
The lack of clarity in assumptions, secondly, largely explains the discrepancies
and lack of coherence in donor support. As long as all assumptions remain
potentially valid, and none has clear authority over the others, each donor
remains free to ‘pick and choose’ among the components of the ASF that best
match its national preferences or habits. The result is a not always coherent
45 Interview, senior AU official, Addis Ababa.
46 Interview, German military adviser, Addis Ababa.
47 Group discussion at the German Permanent Representation to the EU, Brussels (thereafter referred to
as ‘German position’).
48 Interview, senior civil servant, Japanese Embassy, Addis Ababa.
49 Telephone interview, UK civil servant, Addis Ababa, March 2009.
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whole, as was illustrated in the patterns of donor support to PTCs (Section
5.3). Another consequence is that it is extremely difficult to assess the
effectiveness of donor support, as there are no clear benchmarks, or the
hierarchy among those benchmarks is debatable. The question whether the
RDC of a brigade should be ranked higher or lower than its multidimensional
character, for example, has only been averted by declaring the RDCs
multidimensional units. Whether this is conceptually sound and/or practically
feasible, however, has never been addressed.
Besides its inherent complexity, the increased level of ASF ambition has an
immediate consequence: costs. As Africans seem to be gearing more and more
towards leading operations of the same complexity as UN missions and with
no limits in duration or degree of difficulty, the issue of funding their efforts
assumes heightened significance.
7 External support
Providers of financial and technical support to the ASF have a variety of
interests. One cannot but detect: in the French, UK and Belgian approaches
remnants of their colonial legacies; in the Japanese, the country’s economic
interests; in the Canadian, the influences of the Commonwealth and
francophone countries; in the German a degree of ‘guilt complex’ mixed with
angst about potential African immigration (Klingebiel 2005: 12).50
For clarity of presentation, it is useful to distinguish bilateral and multinational
donors. While the former are more clearly motivated by national security
interests, the latter respond to a more institutional approach underpinned by an
ambiguous concept of ‘partnership’, although the financial and political
interests of their member states are never far behind.
7.1 Bilateral donors
7.1.1 United States
Although the US has repeatedly been accused of turning its back on Africa, it
is one of the major providers of PSO support to the continent. The disastrous
mission to Somalia and the Rwandan crisis in 1994 powerfully contributed to
convincing Washington of the necessity to enable the Africans to help
themselves (Franke 2007). The constant rise in the UN peacekeeping budget,
of which the US pays 26 per cent, was an additional incentive (Cilliers 2005;
United States General Accounting Office 2002).
US support to African capacity-building for PSOs has developed in three
stages. In broad terms, it has evolved from bilateral to increasingly multilateral
support strategies, and from a focus on ‘train and equip’ programmes to
50 Interview, Official of the Irish Permanent Representation to the EU.
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training programmes only.51 Extensive logistical and technical assistance is also
provided in kind to operations (African PSOs or the contribution of African
troops to UN operations) and is facilitated by the US maintenance of various
equipment storages around the continent. The US does not provide direct
financial support for operations.
Specifically, US assistance has been successively delivered through: the Africa
Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), launched in 1996, through African
Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) from 2004, and the
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which absorbed ACOTA in 2005
following the G8 Sea Island summit (2004). As of late 2008, the United States
Africa Command (AFRICOM) became the major instrument for the delivery of
US support, giving it greater – and largely unwelcome – visibility.52
ACRI aimed to train 12,000 soldiers from selected countries (AFRICOM 2009a;
Carafano and Gardiner 2003), with each training cycle including a complete
range of modules (aggregated from Berman and Sams 2000: 275;
Globalsecurity 2009). From 1996 until 2002 9,000 troops were trained in total:
Benin, Kenya, Malawi, Mali and Senegal received full battalion-level training
over a three-year cycle, and Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Uganda completed at
least one or two modules. All soldiers were equipped with uniforms, boots,
personal gear, and even eyeglasses where necessary (Berman and Sams
2000: 273).53
Like ACRI, ACOTA remained a bilateral programme, the most significant
difference between them being perhaps a stronger emphasis on train-the-
trainer arrangements, and the fact that ACOTA units would be trained and
equipped for offensive military operations (AFRICOM 2009a; Bah and Aning
2008: 121).
In accordance with G8 commitments, GPOI marked a reorientation of US
assistance towards APSA and ASF goals. GPOI provides multinational training
in PSO skills, supports the development of regional HQs, and provides
technical assistance to improve regional interoperability (Franke 2007). The
ambition of the programme was to train 50,000 troops in Africa and 15,000
elsewhere until 2010, with US$500 million of its US$650 million budget going to
Africa (Peace Operations Factsheet 2005). US assistance has concentrated
primarily on ECOBRIG (following its long-standing relations with many
countries in West Africa), and more recently, EASBRIG, whereas a presidential
authorisation to work with ECCAS was issued but the implementing agreement
has not yet been signed (White House 2009). Assistance to the AU proper
began in 2006.54
51 Interview, US military representative, Libreville, March 2009.
52 See www.africom.mil/. Following an initially extremely cold reaction to its initiative from the great
majority of African states, the US resolved to establish the AFRICOM HQ at Stuttgart, Germany, at
least on a temporary basis.
53 Telephone interview, US military official, Addis Ababa, May 2009.
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Table 7.1 USA budget allocations 1997–2008 per FY in US$ million55
ACRI
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
15 22 18 20 20 20
ACRI ACOTA GPOI (cont. ACOTA)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
40 24 77.4 115 223.25* 161.5
* including US$50 million earmarked to support UNAMID
Besides its capacity-building initiative, the US has also given significant in kind
support, mainly in the form of logistics and technical assistance, to African-led
PSOs since AMIS. For example, it supported a major rotation of Ugandan
troops to AMISOM in March 2010 (AFRICOM 2010) and it has made major
contributions to the field logistics, equipment, and mobility of UN and AU
peacekeepers (US State Department 2009; Kaufman 2008).
7.1.2 Canada
Canada’s support to the APSA is more broadly based than that of the US, both
at source and on the recipients’ side. Canada has a ‘whole of government
approach’ involving the Department of National Defence through its Military
Training and Assistance Program (MTAP), the Foreign Office (DFAIT) with a
Global Peace Operations Program (GPOP), and the Development Agency
(CIDA) supporting institutional build-up in the peace and security sector.56
Support goes to the continental, sub-regional, and national levels, with a
stronger focus on the former two and, as far as the RECs are concerned, to
West and East Africa, although Canada began supporting ECCAS on a small
scale in early 2009. Like the US, Canada provides support both for capacity-
building and for operations.
Its approach differs substantially from that of the US. Whereas Washington’s
focus is mainly on military aspects, Canada concentrates heavily on police
training and development (via GPOP), the development of the AU’s and RECs’
capacity to handle multidimensional deployments (via GPOP and CIDA), and
more recently, the training of civilians (Bernier 2008). Canada’s more
multilaterally oriented approach is also demonstrated by its support to the UN
Peace Support Team (PST) in Addis Ababa (aggregated from Berman and
Sams 2000: 275; Globalsecurity 2009).
54 Interview, US military representative, Libreville, February 2009.
55 Data aggregated from Globalsecurity (2009); US AFRICOM (2009c); Serafino (2007); Franke (2007).
56 Email exchange with Canadian official, Ottawa, March 2009.
57 See www.operationspaix.net.
58 Interview, Canadian civil servant, Addis Ababa.
59 French bases should in the future be limited to Libreville, Gabon, Djibouti and Réunion, following the
restructuring announced in 2010. However, France maintains a fairly important residual presence in
West Africa under various guises (Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, etc.).
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 67
46
A major Canadian channel for the implementation of various support
programmes is the prestigious Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre (PPTC),
which not only develops curricula for existing training centres and training
programmes (KAIPTC, EMP Bamako, IPSTC), but also proactively helps foster
the non-military components of the ASF through support to the joint
Norwegian/ACCORD ‘Training for Peace’ (TfP) programme (see below, Section
7.1.7). Currently, the PPTC is active in peacekeeping training at the national
level in 16 countries in West and Central Africa, the Maghreb and South Africa
(AU 2008f: Annex E). Additionally, Canada is one of the major sponsors of an
increasingly large number of activities undertaken by the Organisation
Internationale de la Francophonie to support PSO training. In francophone
parts of Africa, Canada’s support is mostly channelled through another
Canadian sub-contractor, the Réseau francophone de recherche sur les
opérations de paix (ROP).57
Canada also invests a substantial amount of money in direct support to African
PSOs and African peacekeepers. Its support to AMIS is estimated at €106.5
million between 2004 and 2006 (AU 2008f: Annex E). In 2008, Canada
allocated €16.6 million to deploy up to 50 Canadian personnel to UNAMID and
UNMIS (United Nations Mission in the Sudan) in order to increase the
professional expertise of (mainly African) UN peacekeeping troops in the
Sudan, and renewed its loan of over 100 armoured personnel carriers to
UNAMID (ViveLeCanada 2008). A €25.54 million equipment and training
package for UNAMID over 2006–2007 made Canada ‘the second-largest
voluntary financial supporter’ after the USA (Bernier 2008).
In one way, Canada’s approach may be starting to resemble that of the US, as
Ottawa is looking for an ‘exit strategy’ from the provision of salaries and direct
money transfers. For example, in 2009 Canada was about to introduce
schemes by which the proportion of salaries it pays for expert positions at the
AU will gradually decrease each year until they reach zero. Funds dedicated to
activities will not be affected.58
7.1.3 France
Even more clearly than the US, France has striven to adapt its military
presence in Africa, inherited from colonialism, to the parameters of the APSA.
Initially bilateral, its cooperation has become increasingly multilateral since the
early 2000s, focusing on the RECs (primarily ECOWAS, subsequently ECCAS,
more recently EASBRIG), and the AU. French support to the ASF is delivered
via two channels: the Ministry of Defence, which manages French forces
permanently deployed in Africa,59 and the Direction de la Coopération de
60 Presentation by representative of the French Forces in Gabon (FFG) at the first meeting of training
services in the ECCAS region, Libreville, 8–10 February 2011.
61 Interview, French military official, Libreville, June 2009.
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Sécurité et de Défense (DCSD), a structure meant to combine the technical
assistance efforts of the MoD and the Ministry of the Interior from within the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. French forces provide mostly tactical and pre-
deployment training, occasionally also supporting HQ staff development.
Recently, this effort has been officially presented as aiming to support APSA.60
Despite this change of perspective, and despite the rebaptism of the former
Direction de la Coopération Militaire et de Défense (DCMD) into DCSD, like
Washington’s, Paris’s support remains more developed on the military side and
its relevance to PSOs is not always clear (see Section 7.3), and it has yet to
fully adapt to the multidimensional character of the ASF. Another similarity to
the US is the tendency to decrease equipment support and concentrate on
training and ‘train-the-trainer’ activities that are deemed longer-lasting and cost
less.61 Like the US and Canada, France is otherwise a major provider of
logistics support (strategic transport and basic logistics) to African troops
participating in African and UN-led missions.
France’s flagship programme to support African PSO capacity development
has been the RECAMP programme (Renforcement des capacités africaines de
maintien de la paix). RECAMP has been a comprehensive programme, aimed
at training PSO capacity across all levels – strategic, operational and tactical,
through a series of events culminating in a field training exercise (FTX)
(Ramsbotham et al. 2005b: 19ff; Berman 2002b: 7). From 1998 to 2006,
France led five RECAMP cycles, marked by gradual efforts to match the APSA
framework, to broaden the circles of participants and to ‘europeanise’ the
programme. RECAMP 1 (1998) and 2 (2000) were purely French-led exercises,
involving, respectively, eight West African countries, plus the UK and the US,
and seven Central African countries, plus eight outside partners. RECAMP 3, in
2001, was for the first time conceived as a partnership with an REC – SADC,
and saw the involvement of 25 states, of which 16 were African. The pattern
continued with RECAMP 4, carried out in cooperation with ECOWAS, which
culminated in an FTX in Benin in 2004 involving 12 African countries, 13 other
TCCs, and eight observers. RECAMP 5 began symbolically in Addis Ababa, at
the AU headquarters, in June 2005 and ended with an FTX in Cameroon in
2006 led in cooperation with ECCAS, involving 10 of its member states and
observers from 17 Western states (data aggregated from EMA 2009;
Cameroon Tribune 2006; Berman 2002b).
RECAMP 6 marked the end of the cycle as a French project. Following
protracted domestic negotiations and discussions with European partners
(Guicherd 2006a: 20), RECAMP was folded into an EU project, and has served
as the basis for the ‘Amani-Africa’ exercise in 2010, with France playing the
role of the ‘Framework Nation’ (Amani-Africa Cycle 2008).
Meanwhile, France’s bilateral presence remains strong, but efforts are
underway to re-tailor it to the APSA. Over the past few years, Paris has been
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systematically installing military advisers to the RECs (ECOWAS, ECCAS since
2006, EASBRIG in progress, offered to SADC but it has not responded yet)
and to the AU. French forces permanently stationed in various African locations
work in close relationship with the RECs via Détachements de formation
opérationnels (DIO):62 For example, the French Forces in Gabon (FFG) work
with ECCAS, the FFD in Djibouti cooperate with EASBRIG, and the troops in
La Réunion stand ready to work with SADC. France has had a strong working
relationship with ECOWAS since its support to ECOMICI; the link has remained
via Operation Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire and the 23rd Marines Battalion
garrisoned at Cap Vert (Senegal). Moreover, France’s presence at PTCs via
funding and staff is strong and relatively broad-ranging. In all, the French state
contributes to 14 African PTCs in domains ranging from general officer training
and military medical training, to engineer, pilot and police training, with EMP
Bamako being its flagship project.63 Akin to its move on the exercise side,
France has been attempting to ‘europeanise’ its support to training centres by
attracting EU and partner support to some PTCs on its priority list.64 The
outcome of these efforts, however, remains unclear.
Finally, France is an important provider of operational and logistics support to
African TCCs. For example, in May 2009, the French assumed the
transportation of the Togolese contingent of MINURCAT (United Nations
Mission in the Central African Republic) in CAR/Chad. In CAR itself, the
logistics of MICOPAX, the ECCAS PSO, is largely provided by France, which
thus finances approximately 30 per cent of the operation (aggregated from
Berman and Sams 2000: 275; Globalsecurity 2009). France holds equipment
ready to support African peacekeeping battalions at depots in Dakar, Djibouti,
and Libreville (data aggregated from Ramsbotham et al. 2005b: 19ff; Berman
2002a: 38; Berman 2002b: 9). The French close bilateral military cooperation
with a number of African states offers opportunities to support numerous
activities. The preparation for the Central Brigade’s field training ‘Kwanza’ in
Angola in May–June 2010 owes much to this relationship, although the French
were not involved in the exercise itself.
7.1.4 United Kingdom
Like other donors, but at a slightly earlier stage, the UK has reshaped its peace
and security assistance to Africa to match continental developments. The UK
pioneered the ‘whole of government approach’, connecting the efforts of the
Department for International Development (DFID), the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence into a single cross-
departmental strategy financed and implemented through an Africa Conflict
Prevention Pool (ACPP). The ACPP maximises the effect of the conflict
prevention policies of each of the three departments. It also enables the UK to
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62 Interview, French military official, Libreville, June 2009.
63 Interview, French military representative, Paris, March 2009.
64 For example Eiforces/Awaé, and EGT/Brazzaville.
65 Telephone interview, civil servant, MOD London, April 2009.
66 Interview, senior British military official, Addis Ababa, April 2009.
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match more closely the different components of the ASF and ensure greater
coherence in the support between its military, police and civilian components.
‘Direct UK investment’ in African peace-related projects has been higher than
£110 million annually for nearly a decade.
The ACPP finances a wide array of activities. Among them is the presence of
conflict and PSO advisers with the AU and the RECs (ECOWAS, IGAD and
now EASBRIGCOM) and key staff in major training institutions.65 For example,
in the mid-2000s the UK had a twelve-person British Peace Support Team
(BPST) located at IPSTC Karen (Kenya) (UK National Archive (undated);
Ramsbotham et al. 2005a: 336). It was also one of the major forces behind the
growth of KAIPTC, where it deployed four staff members, including the
Executive Director and the Resource Director for several years, until it
withdrew in 2010. Thanks to its conflict and military advisers deployed to Addis
Ababa, the UK has been behind much of the conceptual development of the
ASF over the past few years.66 The UK is therefore achieving maximum
influence with relatively small numbers of advisers placed in key positions
across the continent.
The UK’s principal training tools are the BPSTs, which tend to focus on officer
or specialist training, and the British Military Advisory and Training Teams
(BMATT), involved in both officer and tactical training. BMATT evolved from a
conventional military scheme to a PSO support programme. Via BPST and
BMATT, the UK differentiates itself from other donors by training large numbers
of sub-Saharan military officers in Africa itself, rather than at its own military
staff colleges (Berman 2002b: 15ff).
Apart from IPSTC, BPST trainers are present at the IMATC in Nairobi and in
South Africa, where they help build the SADC brigade. At IMATC, BPST staff
had trained 700 personnel in humanitarian de-mining and 2000 people in mine
awareness just one year after opening in February 2005 (UK National Archive
(undated)). BMATT trainers can be stationed permanently at key locations or
deliver training upon demand in other countries. An important BMATT group,
BMATT-WA, is based in Accra, working both with the Ghanaian Command and
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Table 7.2 ACPP budget allocations 2002–2010
Financial Year 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2009/10
Programmes £50m £50m £50m £60m £60m £63m £645m £40.5m
PSOs £65m £60m £60m Varies annually based on 7.45% of
total UN peacekeeping costs in Africa
Data aggregated from DFID (2010: 6); DFID (2004: 25); Ministry of Defence UK (2004); Berman (2002b: 14).
67 For UK support to ECOMOG Sierra Leone see Berman (2002b: 18).
68 Interview, senior British military official, Addis Ababa, April 2009.
69 German position.
70 Telephone interview, senior staff member, Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit (GtZ),
Frankfurt, May 2009 (thereafter referred to as GtZ).
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Staff College and KAIPTC, delivering both standard and PSO pre-deployment
training (Berman 2002b: 15ff). In the past few years, BMATT has delivered
training to a total of 20 countries (UK National Archive (undated)); ‘train-the-
trainer’ courses were aimed at teaching international standards for civilian
police (Ramsbotham et al. 2005b: 23–6). Overall, the UK has trained around
14,000 African peacekeepers since 2001 (DFID 2010: 4).
Beyond training, the ACPP also directly supports African PSOs, either in kind
or via financial contributions. When AMIB was launched (in May 2004), the
ACPP provided pre-deployment training (through the BPST) and financed the
transport of 2,600 soldiers from South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique to
Burundi for a total of £5.7 million. As AMIB was re-hatted as ONUB (Opérations
des Nations Unies au Burundi) in June 2004 the mission continued to receive
funding from the ACPP (DFID 2004: 10). The ACPP also shouldered the
running costs of the second ECOWAS operation in Liberia, providing £400,000
to the Nigerian forces.67 Later, the UK provided £3.5 million in support to the
Ghanaian contingent of ECOMICI, including transport, communications, and
running costs, plus another £500,000 to ECOWAS to cover the running costs of
ECOMICI until it was re-hatted as UNOCI (United Nations Mission in Côte
d’Ivoire) in April 2004 (DFID 2004: 10). By September 2005, the UK had given
£32 million in support to AMIS, including 600 vehicles, diverse equipment, and
airlifting of Nigerian troops (UK National Archive (undated)).
Added to a variety of post-conflict programmes, these efforts have represented
a considerable expense for the UK for a number of years. A degree of
impatience is detectable in conversations with British officials, who are
beginning to suggest that the UK may not be willing to pursue its support at
current levels in the absence of greater African efforts.68
7.1.5 Germany
Although Germany’s priorities in relation to PSOs lie in Afghanistan and the
Balkans, its engagement in African peace and security issues is on the rise,
resulting from a mixture of public pressure to increase development aid and
pragmatic considerations linked to the burden represented by Berlin’s
contribution to the UN peacekeeping budget (9 per cent, or €325 million in
2008) and EU’s budget supporting Africa (24 per cent to the original EU APF of
€440 million, and 20.5 per cent of the next tranche of €300 million).69
Four different ministries are involved in German security policy toward Africa:
the Foreign Office (AA), the Defence Ministry (BMVg), the German
Development Ministry (BMZ), and the Home Secretariat (BMI).70 In practice,
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71 The GIZ is the result of a merger of the Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit (GtZ) with the
other major German development service, Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst (DED), and Internationale
Weiterbildung und Entwicklung (Invent), a non-profit organisation in the field of advanced training
(January 2011).
72 German position.
73 GtZ.
74 GtZ.
75 On KAIPTC: GtZ; on Bamako: Bundesregierung (2007).
76 GtZ.
77 GtZ.
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much of the support has been delivered through the development assistance
technical service, the GtZ (Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit), now
GIZ (Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit).71
In contrast with most national donors, who have traditionally had a mainly
bilateral approach, German support squarely targets regional and sub-regional
organisations, including the AU, the RECs and training centres. Like that of
most major donors, its effort has been geographically concentrated in West and
East Africa – ECOBRIG and EASBRIG, and PTCs serving those sub-regions72 –
with strong support also being provided to and through the AU. Thematically,
Germany’s involvement is closer to Canada’s, focusing on police and civilian
capacity-building but it is also more broadly based, including important
contributions to various activities in conflict prevention and institutional
consolidation. This support may cover heavy construction costs (for example,
Germany is spending €20 million on the construction of a new building for the
AU’s Peace and Security Department; it paid for most of the construction costs
of KAIPTC; and it shouldered an important part of the construction costs of
EMP Bamako),73 or various institutional and capacity-building costs (driving and
language skills at the AU, a new PSOD document management system, and
general management training at ECOWAS).74
Via the GtZ/GIZ (for activities financed by the AA and the BMZ) and the BMVg,
Germany is also involved in more ‘classical’ types of activity, such as policy
advice, conceptual development and training. For example, the BMZ finances
consultants to the ECOWAS peace and security department, focusing on the
civilian component of the brigade, and it has deployed senior staff to work on
course management at the KAIPTC in Accra. Further, Germany supports police
training at EMP Bamako and at the Karen PTC.75 At Karen, the then GtZ also
developed curricula for DDR, gender, CIMIC, and human rights training.
However, this project has ended because of the disappointingly low interest of
African actors in taking over these responsibilities.76 Consequently, Germany
will not reduce its overall support but has redirected it toward neighbouring
EASBRIGCOM, where it will continue working on the police and civilian
components of the ASF in East Africa.77 Meanwhile support to SADC remains
‘on ice’ because of the problematic political environment in Zimbabwe.
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However, programmes are reportedly finalised, ready to be revived at the first
opportunity.78
7.1.6 Denmark
Similarly to Germany, Denmark conceives of itself as a loyal, disinterested
partner, willing to support Africa’s own aims, but it has stronger conceptual
convictions inspired by a long-lasting involvement with the UN.79
Denmark’s management of its peace and security policy, like that of other
donors, has been adjusted to match APSA developments. Until 2004–2005,
long-term engagement was carried out by the Ministries of Development and
Foreign Affairs, with the Defence Ministry providing ad hoc mission support.
Then the latter two ministries decided on a new ‘comprehensive approach’
reminiscent of that of Canada and the UK. As part of this new approach a
Danish Advisory and Training Staff (DATS) has since been carrying out support
activities to the AU and, at the regional level, to EASBRIG.
In parallel and up to November 2008, a major instrument of Danish support to
the ASF was the multinational standby readiness brigade for UN operations
(SHIRBRIG), especially in the context of the development of PLANELMs and
operational support to PSOs in Ethiopia, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, and most
recently MINURCAT (SHIRBRIG 2009).80 However, as it appeared that the AU
had little interest in the SHIRBRIG model, SHIRBRIG was folded and a new
‘Task Force Africa’ was established by the Defence Ministry, concentrating on
EASBRIG.81 Task Force Africa builds on the experiences of both DATS and
SHIRBRIG in providing support to EASBRIGCOM. In addition, it is tasked with
coordinating all Danish defence efforts in support of the APSA with other Nordic
countries, the UK and the US. Money originally earmarked for SHIRBRIG has
been redirected to support police training in eastern Africa.82
Recent testimonies suggest that Denmark’s support for the APSA is for the
long haul: Copenhagen will reportedly step up its engagement from 2010 on,
with the deployment of up to 15 officers and civilian experts in support of,
primarily, EASBRIG and the AU HQ.83
78 GtZ.
79 Email exchange with Danish military analyst, Copenhagen, Feb 2009.
80 SHIRBRIG’s mandate was to provide the UN with a non-standing multinational high-readiness brigade
based on the UN Standby Arrangement System. In 2007, 16 American and European states were
cooperating within the SHIRBRIG framework, following an initiative by Denmark. Two African states,
Egypt and Senegal, had sent observers.
81 Interview, Danish senior military adviser, Addis Ababa.
82 Ibid.
83 Email exchange with Danish academic, Copenhagen, February 2009.
84 This section is mainly based on an email exchange with a senior civil servant, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Oslo, April 2009.
85 The African Civilian Standby Roster for Humanitarian and Peace Building Missions.
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7.1.7 Norway84
Norwegian support to the ASF is delivered mostly through the Training for
Peace (TfP) programme. TfP is a civilian capacity-building scheme launched in
1995 by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and three training and
research institutions – the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of
Disputes (ACCORD) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in South Africa,
and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).
TfP has two components. One provides operational training to police and
civilian experts participating in ongoing PSOs. ACCORD, for example, trained
units for pre-deployment to AMISOM, and for the exercises of EASBRIG, and
SADCBRIG (ACCORD 2009; Tjønneland and Albertyn 2010). With KAIPTC
joining TfP in 2004, various capacity-building courses have been offered to
ECOBRIG, including police training for UNAMID. In addition to its formal
partners, TfP cooperates closely with EASBRICOM, the AU PSOD, and
AFDEM,85 an organisation that manages a database of all TfP graduates.
Overall, it is estimated that about 8,600 civilians and police have been trained
via TfP between 1995 and 2007 at an expense of some US$12 million (Training
for Peace 2009).
TfP’s second component is its normative work, which supports the UN, the AU
and the RECs via policy advice and research. A lot of the current conceptual
work on the civilian dimension of the ASF, for instance, is done by ACCORD
through TfP.
With a budget on the increase, but representing a little less than €8.9 million
over 2008–2010, two thirds of which is paid by Norway, TfP remains a modest
programme compared to those of other donors. However, by targeting early a
little-trodden domain of expertise, and underpinning training and policy advice
with research, TfP has achieved effects much beyond some of the better-
endowed programmes.
7.1.8 Italy
Italy’s contribution to African PSOs revolves around the training of Formed
Police Units (FPUs), directly stemming from its own PSO experience in the
Balkans, where the carabinieri played a key role in managing security during
sensitive post-conflict phases. Italy hosts the Centre of Excellence for Stability
Police Units (CoESPU), created in Vincenza in 2004 with US support, on the
back of the commitments of the G8 Sea Island Summit (CoESPU 2009).
CoESPU’s main partner in Africa has been ECOWAS, and police from
Cameroon, Nigeria, Mali and Burkina Faso have participated in train-the-trainer
education at Vincenza (AFRICOM 2009a).
86 Interview, senior Japanese civil servant, Addis Ababa; in 2010 Japan announced a total of
US$700,000 to support Awaé in 2011.
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More recently, Italy has decided to broaden its involvement in African peace
and security issues and give it a higher profile. In July 2008, it rebranded its till
then little-known support for African PSOs, the ‘Italian African Peace Facility’,
and increased its contribution from €9 million a year to €40 million (including
€10 million funding for AMISOM) (African Press Organization 2008). In
February 2008 CoESPU began expanding its activities through Africa by
hosting the annual meeting of Police Commissioners and Senior Police
Advisers of the continent. In January 2010 Italy and the AU reinforced their
commitment to cooperation, but no further funding was allocated (African Press
Organization 2008; Walta Information Centre 2010).
7.1.9 Japan
Japan’s interest in building capacity for African PSOs is directly related to its
share of the UN peacekeeping budget, which is 17 per cent (US$1.15 billion in
2007) (Ramsbotham et al. 2005b: 19; UN 2009a). Japan’s involvement is also
partly linked to its interest in keeping the surroundings of the African continent
safe for trade (25,000 ships with Japanese goods pass the Horn of Africa
annually).
A main difficulty encountered by Japan in its support to the ASF is posed by its
Constitution, which does not condone military support or engagement abroad.
Formally, all activities supported, like workshops or conferences, must facilitate
‘capacity-building’, not ‘military planning’. Even supporting logistics depots
containing military equipment would not be possible. Japan may, however,
support training at PTCs in the non-military field. It did so in Cairo (CCTCRPA)
throughout 2009 and 2010, Bamako (EMP), Karen (IPSTC), and Kigali (RPA)
and is currently considering support to the police school at Awaé in
Cameroon.86 Another way for Japan to circumvent its constitutional difficulties
has been to direct resources towards the AU Peace Fund, which covers
salaries of AU liaison officers at AMISOM in Kenya and Mogadishu.
7.2 Multilateral donors
7.2.1 European Union
The EU has to be considered as an actor in its own right, separate from its
member states. This is particularly so since the creation of the African Peace
Facility (APF) in 2004, and the ‘EU Strategy for Africa’ in 2005 enabled the
European Commission to become the driving force behind a common policy to
support the AU and, more specifically, the APSA and the ASF (European
Commission 2008; European Union 2005).
The EU and Africa (as represented by the AU) intend to present themselves as
partners, in a relationship of equals moving away from traditional donor-
87 The joint strategy was confirmed and updated at a summit in Addis Ababa in November 2010.
88 Interview, ECCAS technical assistant, Libreville, December 2010.
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beneficiary relations and involving the definition of joint strategic goals, a
political dialogue, cooperation in areas such as climate change, or science, as
well as development assistance. This common aim was enshrined in a ‘Joint
Africa-EU Strategic Partnership’ sealed at a summit in Lisbon in December
2007, which superseded the two-year-old EU Strategy for Africa (African
Union/European Union 2007).87 This partnership is also one of the three pillars
of the APF, the other two being the principles of African ownership and
solidarity (the latter as monies were diverted from development aid towards
peace and security).
The APF has allowed the EU – and especially the Commission – to have a
large impact on the development and performance of the ASF since 2004.
First, it has created a fairly sizeable, predictable source of funding for African
operations, without which several AU and REC engagements could not have
been undertaken. Second, it has placed the EU in a leading role in AU and
REC capacity development at HQ levels. The EU, as of itself, however, does
not have the capacity (in terms of human resources) or the will to participate in
conceptual work and does not influence the substance of ASF developments as
much as other donors do.
As it filled a major gap in African needs, the APF had even more ‘success’ than
anticipated, even though the funds cannot be used to finance military
equipment. Initially, €200 million was budgeted for support to PSOs, in a total
APF budget of €250 million. Because of the ever growing needs of AMIS,
however, the EU had to make three successive replenishments over
2006–2008, amounting to €150 million. Additional contributions totalling €40
million came from eight EU member states, so that total APF funding under the
9th European Development Fund (EDF) (2004–2009) was €440 million. Of that
sum, over €305 went to AMIS, €53.2 million to FOMUC/MICOPAX, €35.5
million to AMISOM, and €8.5 million to the AU missions in the Comoros (Africa
and Europe in Partnership 2009: 3, 5).
In contrast to the rapid disbursements for operational purposes, absorption by
the AU and RECs of the smaller €35 million capacity-building component of the
APF under the 9th EDF has been disappointing. That component is supposed
to support institutional development at the AU and the RECs, including
recruitment, training and equipment of the early warning systems and the
PLANELMs, conceptual development, and some field training. By March 2010,
close to the original June 2010 closing date of the programme, hardly more
than 40 per cent of the budget had been spent.88 This is largely due to the
weakness in administrative and financial management of the AU/RECs
discussed above, as well as to insufficient programme implementation capacity.
Partly as a result of this underspending, the APF 9th EDF was extended by ten
months to terminate in April 2011.89
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Regardless of current difficulties, the EU is committed to pursuing its support.
€300 million has been earmarked for the APF under the 10th EDF (2008–13)
(African Union/European Union 2009; Africa and Europe in Partnership 2009:
6), of which €65 million will go to capacity-building, and €200 million to PSOs.90
This is an addition to EU support via the so-called Regional Indicative
Programmes (RIPs), where the share of funding allocated to peace and
security increases steadily (for instance, the EU will allocate €120 million to
ECOWAS for capacity-building under the 10th EDF RIP, and €15 million to
ECCAS) (Guicherd 2007: 21–3; Klingebiel 2006: 54).
7.2.2 United Nations
The United Nations (UN) is not a ‘donor’ – like the AU, it relies on the
contributions of member states and various other organisations to finance its
activities. Nor is it ‘external’, in the sense that it is the all-encompassing body
under which regional organisations like the AU operate (according to Chapter
VIII of the UN Charter). It is, however, a set of institutions and agencies that
possess the know-how and occasional funding (from various donors) to assist
the AU and the RECs in developing their capacity and carrying out their
operations. UN member states agree to this assistance for diverse reasons –
some in the hope of fostering African ownership, others of bringing down their
contribution to the UN peacekeeping budget. Such was the logic behind the
commitment made by the World Summit in 2005 to deploy a ten-year capacity-
building plan in favour of Africa (United Nations 2005b: para. 93; AU 2006c).
The implementation of that plan was slow in coming though, largely because it
involved protracted inter-agency discussions at the UN, which led to the UN
Development Programme (UNDP) ceding ground to the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in supporting AU capacity-building. DPKO
came to the fore as a consequence of the de facto already strong advisory role
it had played in supporting the DITF of AMIS,91 and of its in-depth intellectual
involvement in the conceptual development of the ASF through the 2005–2006
workshops (see Section 5.1). Officially launched in November 2006, the ten-
year plan did not have much substance until the DPKO-led PST was firmly on
the ground in Addis Ababa in January 2007. The PST has been tasked with
supporting the AU in the fields of ‘training, military, police, logistics, finance,
and communication’ (UN 2008b: 5).92 By bringing the UN closer to the AU, the
PST presence has reinforced the trend for ASF concepts and standards to
more and more closely resemble those of the UN. This trend, however, is also
inherent in the development of joint missions, such as UNAMID, or the in-built
89 Another reason for the postponement was the poor results of audits on past instalments of the APF
(operations and capacity-building), which the EU wanted to see clarified before pursuing new
commitments.
90 Plus €15m for early response mechanisms, €7m for auditing etc., and €13m for contingencies.
91 UNPST, group discussion.
92 Interview, UN official, Addis Ababa.
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UN support to the AU in the management of AMISOM. In either case –
capacity-building or the management of operations – the risk of UN staff
substituting itself to AU staff exists (UN 2008a: para. 3.9). Other providers of
technical assistance encounter the same dilemma.
7.3 Assessing donor support
Assessing donor support accurately and comprehensively is beyond the scope
of the present study. It is, however, possible to formulate some observations in
regards to two important criteria in any assessment: coherence and impact.
Coherence is important as it conditions the quality of the outcomes and, to
some extent, the effectiveness of the support (scattered efforts lead to a waste
of human and financial resources). Coherence can be considered here in
regard to the aim pursued, the complementariness of the specific programmes
carried out by donors, and coordination efforts on the part of the AU/RECs.
Difficulties in coherence relating to aims have already been highlighted: the still
evolving character of the ASF makes it difficult for donors to target their
support appropriately and leads to discrepancies among them (Section 6). This
makes donor coordination even more vital, but such coordination remains ever
a challenge (Ramsbotham et al. 2005a: 334). First, donor coordination is
difficult because it carries transaction costs.93 In other words, it is time-and
effort-consuming. Second, as described above, each donor is motivated by its
own national interests. Real coordination would require a readiness to adapt
national programmes, which most donors do not have the flexibility to do for a
variety of political and bureaucratic reasons. Third, there is a degree of
competition among donors, primarily for reasons of political visibility on the
international scene and before home constituents.94 The consequence is gaps,
overlaps, and, in the case of military training or equipment, problems of inter-
operability in the field (Guicherd 2006b: 4).
Efforts have been made, however, over the past few years to improve donor
coordination, in which some countries, like Britain and Norway, have proved
more committed than others.95 Britain has largely led the way in donor
coordination, both at the strategic level and in Addis Ababa. Thus, the UK
initiated the ‘G8 Clearinghouse’ process in preparation for the 2005 Gleneagles
Summit. Clearinghouse meetings, however, at least seven of which have taken
place so far, have produced only limited effects.96 This can be illustrated by an
anecdote: the meeting in San Remo in April 2009 decided to create a
homepage to facilitate information exchanges (G8 2009);97 none of the 60 or so
93 German position.
94 Interview, AU Commission representative, Addis Ababa.
95 Email exchange, senior civil servant, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, April 2009.
96 Interview, Japanese senior civil servant, Addis Ababa.
97 www.g8africaclearinghouse.org.
98 Interview, Canadian official, Addis Ababa
99 Interview, UN official, Addis Ababa.
100 Email exchange with Canadian official, Ottawa, March 2009.
101 Interview, senior EU official, Brussels.
102 Interview, senior AU official, Addis Ababa.
103 Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Sweden, Spain,
Switzerland, Turkey, UK, USA (AU 2009a).
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experts present was aware that a similar decision had already been taken at
the first meeting in Washington (October 2004), but that the page had
remained stillborn. Whether the resurrection of the plan at San Remo will be
more successful remains to be seen.
In Addis Ababa two donor coordination groups have been created, one
focusing on PSOs and another on capacity-building.98 The UK took the lead
during the first year (2007), organising fairly frequent meetings. Attendance
would generally be high. As the US took over, the pace dropped and, with it,
the participation. Consultation meetings have reportedly restarted successfully
since the UK resumed responsibility in 2009.99 This example demonstrates how
donor coordination remains, to a large extent, an ad hoc process, left to the
goodwill, interest, discipline, and agenda of the donors. Focused bilateral
cooperation, for example between Germany and Canada in the police area, is
easier and more effective.100
Donor coordination should ideally come from the AU/RECs themselves. Such
coordination, however, remains subject to two constraints. One is
institutional/political: with less coordinated donors, African institutions have
more leeway to request overlapping funding.101 Another is administrative:
neither the AU nor the RECs have the capacity to coordinate donors. The
AU/PSOD for its part is overwhelmed by the number and variety of donor
approaches (Mackie et al. 2006: 75).102
Efforts are underway, on both the AU/RECs and donor sides, to remedy this
problem. ECOWAS, for example, has created a financial management unit to
coordinate contributions from both member states and donors to its Peace
Fund. At the AU, the arrival of Jean Ping as new Chair of the Commission has
given new momentum to donor coordination: in February 2009 the AU signed
an agreement with a group of 26 bilateral partners on a new standardised
reporting format.103 This should relieve much pressure on the AU administration.
Passing judgement on the second assessment criterion, impact, is even more
difficult than on coherence. Much of the institutional capacity-building work is
very recent and the depth of experience insufficient for a collective assessment
of the performance of AU and REC staff. Lasting shortcomings in numbers,
especially at the AU, despite donors’ readiness to finance posts, remain an
important constraint. A more positive indicator is conceptual development,
where donors’ support has allowed the AU/RECs to make substantial progress
over recent decades.
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A key question mark continues remains over the effectiveness and relevance of
training. This is an issue with which donors have struggled for a number of
years, and which is reputedly difficult to document. Scattered evidence
provides a mixed picture (United States General Accounting Office 2008: 46ff;
Ramsbotham et al. 2005b: 11).
Regarding training relevance, it has to be recognised, first, that some activities
called PSO capacity-building actually do so only according to the most liberal
definition. For example, the jungle training offered by the French Marine
Infantry in Libreville in 2008 for selected ECCAS troops would hardly seem to
qualify (Revue Frères d’Armes 2009).
Defining what qualifies as a ‘trained soldier’ is another difficulty.104 For instance,
full ACOTA training is premised on the completion of a training cycle including
three successive steps. Gabon participated in the programme without ever
sending a coherent battalion; at the end of the cycle, no ‘unit’ was trained but
about 1,800 Gabonese soldiers had had some peacekeeping instruction.105
Actually, it is a recurrent (although never officially addressed) observation of
Western advisers that African military establishments often show little interest
in the content of the training, their main concern being a high turnover of
soldiers and officers sent to courses where they are paid, housed, and fed.106
One also has to consider that all training has a relatively short ‘best before
date’. Given the fact that normal battalion rotations anywhere entail a change
of personnel of approximately 70 per cent every two years, training effects are
bound to be short-lived unless soldiers are deployed rapidly,107 all the more so
since ‘follow up training is rarely provided’.108
Despite all these hurdles, there is evidence that units trained by partners have
indeed participated in PSOs in fairly large numbers. ACRI-trained units from
Mali and Ghana served in Sierra Leone, units from Benin in Guinea-Bissau,
and a Senegalese battalion in the CAR. ACOTA-trained soldiers served in
PSOs in Burundi, Darfur, the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire and Somalia (US AFRICOM
2009; Sierra Leone News 2009), and of the 17 African GPOI partners that had
received training by 2007, 12 had deployed troops to PSOs at least once
(Serafino 2007). RECAMP-trained troops from many francophone African
countries have deployed to African and UN PSOs (for example, Senegal with
AMIS and UNAMID, Togo with MINURCAT) and all troops deployed to
FOMUC/MICOPAX in the CAR receive pre-deployment training from the
French.109 An excellent success story in capacity-building is the deployment of
the first Sierra Leonean peacekeepers with UNAMID in December 2009, the
104 Telephone interview, US military adviser, Addis Ababa, April 2009.
105 Interview, US military representative, Libreville, February 2009.
106 Interviews, French, British and American military representatives, March–April 2009.
107 Interview, senior EU Council adviser, Brussels.
108 Interview, ECCAS representative, Addis Ababa.
109 Interview, French military adviser, Libreville, June 2009.
110 Telephone interview, US military adviser, Addis Ababa, April 2009.
111 Interview, senior British representative, Addis Ababa. Available data confirms this: whilst African
countries had approximately 21,000 peacekeepers in UN operations in January 2011, they had barely
9,000 troops under AU or REC banners.
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result of patient efforts by the UK to transform groups that were basically
armed gangs into a professional, capable force (US AFRICOM 2009). By
December 2010 Sierra Leone had contributed 312 peacekeepers worldwide
(UN 2010). Conversely, some countries like Botswana, whose armed forces
have participated in several PSO training cycles, have never been deployed,110
and a programme like TfP estimates that only one fourth of the individuals it
has trained have actually taken part in an operation (Training for Peace 2009).
These mixed results have led most donors to increasingly emphasise the ‘train-
the-trainer’ concept, and some (like the UK) to concentrate on officers, whose
impact may be longer-lasting. Current efforts to focus assistance on ‘Centres of
excellence’ are also intended to increase the coherence among training
programmes, reinforce the linkage between training provided and the needs of
the AU/RECs, and strengthen the capacity to follow up trained alumni.
Meanwhile, donors’ increasing emphasis on training, at the expense of
logistical and equipment support, is creating tensions with African recipients
(Ramsbotham et al. 2005b: 3ff; Guicherd 2006b: 3; Klingebiel 2005: 15).
8 African ownership
International donors and African recipients share a common objective:
lessening Africa’s dependence on uncertain international responses to conflict
situations on the continent and increasing its capacity to react quickly,
appropriately and in a manner that nips conflicts in the bud and establishes
lasting peace.
‘Ownership’ is the mantra of donors’ programmes, jointly with the motto of
‘partnership’. A few comments on ‘ownership’ therefore seem appropriate, and
it appears useful analytically to distinguish several levels.
At the ‘macro’ level, there is a kind of ownership that can be described as
‘ideological’. ‘Ideological ownership’ characterises the strength of high-level
statements endorsing the goals of the APSA and the ASF and their main
features. This can be considered as achieved since the early 2000s, as
documented in Section 3. At a somewhat lower level, there is a ‘political
ownership’, which we shall define as the willingness of African states to
participate in actual operations. On that front, the picture is mixed. Whilst Africa
has demonstrated its determination to undertake missions such as the early
ECOWAS operations in West Africa, and later AMIS or AMISOM, the level of
participation of various states is quite uneven. For example, after three years of
operation, AMISOM still relies on two states only (Uganda and Burundi).
Countries like Nigeria, Ghana or Senegal are known to prefer sending troops to
UN missions, where they are better catered for, than to AU missions.111
112 German position.
113 Interview, senior ECCAS official, Libreville, June 2009.
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There is, next, a kind of ‘sociological ownership’112 which describes the
appropriation by certain groups working on the ASF. Many observers working
closely with the AU and the RECs note that this sociological ownership exists
among the small group of people whose daily occupation it is to develop the
ASF. However, they have difficulty observing it in African countries at the
national level.113
A fourth aspect is ‘technical ownership’, which can be characterised by the
understanding and acceptance of ASF concepts by PLANELMs, larger AU and
REC HQs, and the relevant ministries and agencies of member states. In that
respect, ownership can be described as poor to the extent that work on the
ASF has largely been led by military establishments, with very little
participation of police and civilian experts and relevant ministries. The
understanding of the ASF as a multidimensional tool is not yet widely shared,
whether by Africans or donor establishments.
Finally, but no less importantly, there is ‘financial ownership’. At that level, as
demonstrated above (Sections 5.6, and 7), ownership remains a distant
objective. Lack of autonomous financing remains the Achilles’ heel of the ASF.
9 Conclusions
There is no alternative to helping Africans help themselves. Neither is there
peacekeeping on the cheap, whether for Africans, who will sooner or later have
to take the lead, nor for external partners, who will pursue their supportive role
for the foreseeable future.
Lessons drawn from PSOs in Africa are being gradually applied in new
capacity development, but efforts will have to be further streamlined and better
coordinated to improve results. For these efforts to be sustainable, the balance
between external support and African contributions needs to shift away soon
from the former toward the latter. It is only by proactively assuming political,
conceptual and financial ownership that AU member states will credibly
demonstrate that the ASF is not an entirely foreign-mastered project but that
the solutions they bring to African problems are truly ‘African’.
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Annex: List of African Peacekeeping
Training Centres
ACCORD African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes,
Durban/South Africa
ACSRS African Centre for Strategic Research Studies (National War
College), Abuja/Nigeria
CEOMP Centre d'Entraînement pour les Opérations de Maintien de la
Paix, Lomé/Togo
CCTCRPA Cairo Centre for Training in Conflict Resolution and
Peacekeeping in Africa, Cairo/Egypt
CPADD Centre de Formation au Déminage Humanitaire,
Ouidah/Benin
CSID Collège Supérieur Interarmées de Défense,
Yaoundé/Cameroon
EASS Ecole d’application des Services de Santé
EEML Ecole d’état Major de Libreville, Libreville/Gabon
EGT Ecole du Génie et des Travaux Marien Ngouabi,
Brazzaville/Congo
EIFORCES Ecole Internationale des Forces de Sécurité, Awaé/Cameroon
EMP Ecole pour le Maintien de la Paix Beye, Bamako/Mali
ILEA International Law Enforcement Academy, Gaborone/Botswana
IMATC International Mine Action Training Centre, Nairobi/Kenya
IPSTC International Peace Support Training Centre, Karen/Kenya
IPCS Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania
KAIPTC Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre,
Accra/Ghana
LECIA Legon Centre for International Affairs, Accra/Ghana
PMTC Peace Mission Training Centre, Pretoria/South Africa
RPA Rwanda Peace Academy, Kigali/Rwanda
RPTC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, Harare/Zimbabwe -
reopened in 2007/questionable operability
63
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 67
References
(Last access to all internet resources until 2009 – 26 June;
later – 22 January 2011)
Aboagye, F. (2008) ‘Shared Responsibility to Protect? Global and Regional
Approaches to Peacekeeping in Africa’, paper presented at the Potsdam Spring
Dialogues, 4–5 April
—— (2004) ‘The African Mission in Burundi – Lessons Learned from the First
African Union Peacekeeping Operation’, ACCORD Special Edition on
Peacekeeping 2: 9–15
ACCORD (2009) CPPC 2009 Course Dates,
www.accord.org.za/courses/peacekeeping/dates
Africa and Europe in Partnership (2009) ‘The African Peace Facility’,
presentation, www.africa-eu-partnership.org/documents/african-peace-facility
African Press Organization (2008) Italian African Peace Facility, blog,
http://appablog.wordpress.com/2008/07/02/italian-africa-peace-facility-the-
commission-of-the-african-union-and-italy-agree-on-new-projects-to-be-funded-
through-the-italian-africa-peace-facility/
African Union (2010a) ‘Declaration Finale des Chefs d’État Major et des
Services de Sécurité des États membres de l’Union Africaine’, Addis Ababa,
3–7 December
—— (2010b) ‘PSOD Key Elements of the Policy Documents of the African
Standby Force’, paper prepared for the 4th Ordinary Meeting of the Specialised
Technical Committee on Defence, Safety, and Security, the preparatory meeting
to 2010a of the African Chiefs of Defence Staff and Heads of Security and
Safety Services, Addis Ababa, 3–7 December
—— (2009a) ‘Meeting of the AU Partners Group Peace and Security with
Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra, Joint Communiqué’, Addis Ababa,
17 February
—— (2009b) ‘The 6th Meeting of African Chiefs of Defence Staff and Heads of
safety and Security, and the 3rd Ordinary Meeting of the Specialised Technical
Committee on Defence, Safety and Security’, Addis Ababa, 11–15 May
—— (2009c) ‘Generic Concept of the ASF AUPOL Formed Police Units’,
developed at ASF AUPOL Workshop, Dakar, 14–17 April
—— (2009d) ‘Rapport de l’Atelier de Travail de la Capacité de Développent
Rapide tenu dans la Communauté Economique des États de l’Afrique
Centrale’, Libreville, Gabon, 6–7 April
—— (2009e) ‘Rapport de l’Atelier de Travail de la Capacité de Deploiment
Rapide tenu dans la Communauté Economique des États de l’Afrique
Centrale’, Libreville, 6–7 April
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 67
64
—— (2009f) ‘Conclusions of the AU Peace Support Operations Division,
Technical Rostering Workshop’, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 1–3 July
—— (2008a) ‘Consultative Meeting between the African Union Commission, the
Regional Economic Communities, Regional Mechanisms and the Planning
Elements of the African Standby Force (ASF) Regional Brigades’, Addis Ababa,
30–31 July 2008
—— (2008b) ‘African Standby Force (ASF) Civilian Staffing, Training and
Rostering Workshop’, Kampala, 10–12 July
—— (2008c) ‘Cinquième Réunion des Chefs d’État-Major et des Chefs des
Services de Sécurité Africains, et Deuxième Réunion des Ministres de la
Défense et de Sécurité’, Addis Ababa, 24–28 March
—— (2008d) ‘Annual Consultations between the AU, the Regional Economic
Communities/Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and
Resolution, the G8 Member Countries and Other Partners’, Addis Ababa,
13 June
—— (2008e) ‘Report of the Meeting of Experts, Meeting of Experts of the 5th
Meeting of Heads of State and Major African Heads of Security Services and
the Second Regular Meeting of Ministers of Defence and Security’, Addis
Ababa, 24–26 March
—— (2008f) ‘Report of the Second Annual African Standby Force Training
Implementation Workshop’, Addis Ababa, 17–18 December
—— (2008g) ‘The African Standby Force Roadmap II’, adopted at the
Consultative Meeting between the African Union Commission, the Regional
Economic Communities, Regional Mechanisms and the Planning Elements of
the African Standby Force (ASF) Regional Brigades, Addis Ababa, 30–31 July
2008
—— (2008h) ‘Déclaration de la Retraite de Réflexion entre l’Union Africaine et
les Mécanismes Régionaux pour la Prévention, la Gestion et le Règlement des
Conflits’, Algiers, 5–6 January
—— (2008i) ‘Policy Framework Guidelines for AU Police at RECs/RMs Level’,
Algiers, 18–20 October
—— (2008j) ‘Police Dimension Staffing, Training and Rostering Workshop’,
Algiers 18–20 October 2008
—— (2007) Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of
Peace and Security between the African Union, the Regional Economic
Communities, and the Coordinating Mechanism of the Regional Standby
Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa, Addis Ababa
—— (2006a) ‘Draft Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the African
Standby Force’, African Union Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD),
1 September
65
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 67
—— (2006b) Peace Support Operations Doctrine, Final Draft, Peace Support
Operations Division, Peace and Security Directorate
—— (2006c) Declaration, Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation: Framework for the
Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the African Union, AU Observer
Mission to the UN, www.aumission-ny.org/declaration.htm
—— (2005) ‘Roadmap for the Operationalisation of the African Standby Force’,
EXP/AU-RECs/ASF/4(I), Experts’ Meeting on the Relationship between the AU
and the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and
Resolution, Addis Ababa, 22–23 March
—— (2004a) ‘Decision on the African Standby Force and the Military Staff
Committee’, Assembly of the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 6–8 July
—— (2004b) African Union Commission on the Establishment of the Darfur
Integrated Task Force (DITF), www.africa-union.org/root/au/AUC/Departments/
psc/ditf/ditf.htm
—— (2003) ‘Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby
Force and Military Staff Committee, (Part 1 and 2 Annexes)’, document
adopted by the 3rd meeting of African chiefs of staff, Addis Ababa, 12–14 May
—— (2002) Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security
Council of the African Union, First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the
African Union, Durban, South Africa, entry into force 26 December 2003
—— (2000) Constitutive Act of the African Union, OAU Assembly, Lome, Togo,
10–12 July, entry into force 26 May 2001, www.chr.up.ac.za/hr_docs/
documents/African_Union_Constitutive_Act.pdf
African Union/European Union (2010) ‘Report of the African Union and
European Union Support to African Training Institutions Workshop’, Nairobi,
8–12 February 2010
—— (2009) ‘Joint Communiqué’, Addis Ababa, 2 February
—— (2007) The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, A Joint Africa-EU Strategy,
www.eu2007.pt/UE/ven/Noticias_Documentos/20071209PARCEST.htm
AFRICOM (2010) NATO Provides Airlift Support to African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM), www.flickr.com/photos/africom/4456994582/
—— (2009a) International Police Officers Train for Peacekeeping Missions in
Africa, www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=2978&lang=0
—— (2009b) Eastern African Forces Work Together in Historical Field
Exercise, www.hoa.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=3760
Amani-Africa Cycle (2009a) Report at the Contributors’ Conference, Brussels,
6 February, www.amaniafricacycle.org/spip.php?article24
—— (2009b) Carana Scenario, www.amaniafricacycle.org/spip.php?article28
—— (2008) EuroRecamp, www.amaniafricacycle.org/spip.php?article2
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 67
66
AMISOM (2009) Overview of the SPMU, www.africa-
union.org/root/AU/AUC/Departments/PSC/AMISOM/AMISOM_SPMU.htm
Aneme, G.A. (2008) ‘The African Standby Force: Major Issues under “Mission
Scenario Six”’, Political Perspectives 2.1
Aning, E. (2004) ‘Investing in Peace and Security in Africa: The Case of
ECOWAS’, Conflict, Security and Development 4.3
—— (1999) ‘Peacekeeping Under ECOMOG: A Sub-regional Approach’, in
J. Cilliers (ed.), From Peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies: Peace Support
Missions in Africa, Pretoria: South African Institute of International Affairs and
the Institute for Security Studies
AU-PSOD (2010) Manual Générique de la Police de l’Union Africaine pour les
Opérations de Soutien de la Paix, compilé et révisé par la Police de l’Union
Africaine en collaboration avec l’APSTA
Bah, S. and Aning, K. (2008) ‘US Peace Operations Policy in Africa; from ACRI
to AFRICOM’, International Peacekeeping 15.1
Berman, E. (2004) ‘African Regional Organisations’ Peacekeeping Experiences
and Capabilities’, Conflict Trends 2
—— (2003) ‘The Provision of Lethal Military Equipment: French, UK and US
Peacekeeping Policies toward Africa’, Security Dialogue 34.2
—— (2002a) ‘African Regional Organisations’ Peace Operations –
Developments and Challenges’, African Security Review 11.4: 33–44,
www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/11No4/Berman.pdf
—— (2002b) French, UK and US Policies to Support Peacekeeping in Africa –
Current Status and Future Prospects, NUPI Working Paper 622, Oslo
Berman, E. and Sams, K. (2000) Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and
Culpabilities, Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and
the Institute for Security Studies
—— (1998) Constructive Disengagement: Western Efforts to Develop African
Peacekeeping, ISS Monograph 33, Pretoria
Bernier, M. (2008) Speech of the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Khartoum, 26 April, http://w01.international.gc.ca/Minpub/publication.aspx?
publication_id=385984&lang=eng&docnum=64
Boshoff, H. (2003a) ‘The AU Mission in Burundi, Technical and Operational
Dimensions’, African Security Review 12.3
—— (2003b) Burundi: The African Union’s First Mission, African Security
Analysis Report, Pretoria: Institute for Strategic Studies
Cameroon Tribune (2006) ‘Recamp V: Place aux Manoeuvres’, www.cameroon-
tribune.net/article.php?lang=Fr&oled=j12012007&idart=40216&olarch=
j13112006
67
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 67
Carafano, J. and Gardiner, N. (2003) ‘US Military Assistance for Africa: A Better
Solution’, Background Paper 1697, Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation
Cilliers, J. (2005) ‘UN Reform and Funding Peacekeeping in Africa’, African
Security Review 14, www.iss.co.za/ASR/14No2/ECilliers.htm#
—— (1999) ‘Regional African Peacekeeping Capacity – Mythical Construct or
Essential Tool?’, in J. Cilliers (ed.), From Peacekeeping to Complex
Emergencies: Peace Support Missions in Africa, Pretoria: South African
Institute of International Affairs and the Institute for Security Studies
Clayton, T. (2001) ‘African Military Capabilities in Insurrection, Intervention and
Peace Support Operations’, in O. Furley and R. May (eds), African
Interventionist States, Aldershot: Ashgate
CoESPU (2009) Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units, homepage,
www.carabinieri.it/Internet/Coespu/02/Activities
Daniel, D.C.F. (ed.) (2008) Peace Operations, Trends, Progress, and
Prospects, Washington DC: Georgetown University Press
De Coning, C. (2007) The Implications of the Integrated Missions Concept for
Training in United Nations and African Union Peace Operations, African Peace
Support Trainers’ Association, www.apsta-africa.org/news/article17072007.php
Dersso, S.A. (2010) The Role and the Place of the African Standby Force
within the African Peace and Security Architecture, ISS Paper 209, Pretoria:
Institute for Security Studies
—— (2009) ‘Developments and Challenges in the Operationalisation of the
ASF: An Insider’s Perspective’, conference report of the ISS/APSTA Seminar
on the ASF, Addis Ababa, 8 April
DFI International (1997) ‘African Capabilities for Peace Operations: An
Assessment in Support of the African Crisis Response Initiative’, in E. Berman
and K. Sams (2000), Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities,
Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the Institute
for Security Studies
DFID (2010) Africa Conflict Prevention Programme Annual Report 2009/10,
www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/afr-cnflt-prev-prog-ann-rpt-0910.pdf
—— (2004) The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool – An Information Document: A
Joint UK Government Approach to Preventing and Reducing Conflict in Sub-
Saharan Africa, London: DFID
EASBRICOM (2009) Report of the First Extraordinary Assembly of Heads of
State and Governments of Eastern Africa Region, 28 January, Addis Ababa,
www.easbrig.org/docs/assexo1jan07.pdf
ECCAS-CEEAC (2009) Séminaire Sous Régional sur la Réforme des Secteurs
de la Sécurité, Kinshasa, 13–15 January
—— (2008) Catalogue des Unités 2010 de la 1ère Brigade en Attente de la
Force Multinationale de l’Afrique Centrale, compiled 26 February
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 67
68
EMA (2009) Recamp 5, État-Major des Armées, www.recamp5.org/logo_
recamp5.php
Ero, C. (1999) ‘The Future of ECOMOG in West Africa’, in J. Cilliers (ed.),
From Peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies: Peace Support Missions in
Africa, Pretoria: South African Institute of International Affairs and the Institute
for Security Studies
European Commission (2008) African Peace Facility,
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/
index_en.htm
European Union (2005) EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African Pact to
Accelerate Africa’s Development, endorsed at the Brussels European Council,
{SEC(2005)1255, http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/
04_eu_strategy_for_africa_12_10_2005_en.pdf
Feitz, F.H. (2002) Peacekeeping Fiascos of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and
U.S. Interests, Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Publishing
FOMUC (2008) Force Multinationale en Centrafrique, Opérations de Paix,
University of Montreal, www.operationspaix.net/-fomuc-
Franke, B. (2007) ‘Enabling a Continent to Help Itself: U.S. Military Capacity
Building and Africa’s Emerging Security Architecture’, Strategic Insights 6.1
—— (2006) ‘In Defence of Regional Peace Operations in Africa’, Journal of
Humanitarian Affairs, Spring, www.jha.ac/articles/185a.pdf
Fukuyama, F. (1992) The End of History and the Last Man, London: Penguin
G8 (2009) ‘Sixth Clearinghouse Conference, Italian Presidency Conclusions’,
San Remo, 2–3 April, courtesy of the British MOD
g8italia2009 (2009) www.g8italia2009.it/G8/Home/G8_africa/G8-
G8_Layout_locale-119988211G809_Evoluzione_G8Africa.htm
Gberie, L. and Addo, P. (2004) ECOWAS Efforts to Resolve the Crisis, ISS
Monograph 105, www.iss.co.za/pubs/Monographs/No105/3ECOWAS.htm
Globalsecurity (2009) African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance,
Alexandria, VA, www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/acri.htm
Guicherd, C. (2007) The AU in Sudan: Lessons Learned for the African
Standby Force, New York: IPA (now IPI)
—— (2006a) ‘Partnerships for Peace Operations: The Role of the EU and
NATO in Africa’, unpublished paper, courtesy of Dr Guicherd
—— (2006b) The United Nations Contribution to African Capacity-Building for
Peacekeeping, New York; IPA
Guillard, J. (2007) Speech given by the Vice Admiral, French Chief of Staff at
the inauguration of EMP ‘Beye’, Bamako, 26 March
69
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 67
High Level Panel on the AU Audit (2007) AU Audit, courtesy of PSOD
Howe, H. (1996) ‘Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping’,
International Security 21.3: 145–76
Hull, C. and Svensson, E. (2008) African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM):
Exemplifying African Union Peacekeeping Challenges, Stockholm: Swedish
Defence Research Agency
Hutchful, E. (1999) ‘Peacekeeping under Conditions of Resource Stringency:
Ghana’s Army in Liberia’, in J. Cilliers (ed.), From Peacekeeping to Complex
Emergencies: Peace Support Missions in Africa, Pretoria: South African
Institute of International Affairs and the Institute for Security Studies
Institute for Security Studies (2004) Non Paper on the Operationalisation of the
African Standby Force, Pretoria, March, www.iss.co.za/dynamic/administration/
file_manager/file_links/NONPAPMAR04.PDF?link_id=31&slink_id=254&link_typ
e=12&slink_type=13&tmpl_id=3
International Institute for Strategic Studies (2009) ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’, in ISS,
The Military Balance, London: ISS, www.informaworld.com/smpp/
title~content=t716100759
Isturiz, F. (2005) ‘Military Forces’ Training for Post-conflict Peacebuilding
Operations’, in A. Schnabel and H-G. Ehrhart (ed.), Security Sector Reform and
Post-conflict Peacebuilding, New York: United Nations University Press
Kaufman, S. (2008) U.S. Envoy Urges Additional Peacekeepers for Darfur,
U.S. Department of State, www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1681&blog=all
Khobe, M.M. (2000) The Evolution and Conduct of ECOMOG Operations in
West Africa, ISS Monograph 44
Kinzel, W. (2008) The African Standby Force der Afrikanischen Union:
Ehrgeizige Pläne, Große Regionale Disparitäten, Berlin: SWP Studie
Klingebiel, S. (2006) Donor Contributions to the Strengthening of the African
Peace and Security Architecture, Bonn: DEI/GDI
—— (2005) Wie viel Gewicht für Militärische Fähigkeiten? Die neue Friedens
und Sicherheitsarchitektur Afrikas und die Rolle Externer Akteure, Discussion
Paper 1, Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Bonn
Landsberg, C. (1999) ‘Willing but Unable: Small States and Peacekeeping in
Africa’, in J. Cilliers (ed.), From Peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies: Peace
Support Missions in Africa, Pretoria: South African Institute of International
Affairs and the Institute for Security Studies
Le Phare (2010) ‘Les Armées de l’Afrique Centrale évaluent “Kwanza 2010”’,
Kinshasa, 27 October
Levine, D.H. (2008) African Civilian Police Capacity for International
Peacekeeping Operations, Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Center
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 67
70
Lindstrom, G. (2007) Enter the EU Battlegroups, Chaillot Paper 97, Institute for
Security Studies/European Union
Mackie, J.; Bah, A.; Frederiksen, J. and Sabiiti, S. (2006) Mid Term Evaluation
of the African Peace Facility, ECORYS/ECDPM/ISS/CECORE, Maastricht,
19 January, www.ecdpm.org/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0//
A96DA4D82E645FCEC125761E005016AD/$FILE/APF Evaluation – Final
Report Ecorys version _010206 KG_.pdf
Malan, M. (2008) ‘Africa: Building Institutions on the Run’, in D. Daniel (ed.),
Peace Operations, Washington DC: Georgetown University Press
Mandrup, T. (2009) South Africa and the SADC Stand-by Force, Royal Danish
Defence College, www0.sun.ac.za/sdorm/index2.php?option=com_docman&
task=doc_view&gid=118&Itemid=26
Meinken, A. (2005) Militärische Kapazitäten und Fähigkeiten afrikanischer
Staaten: Ursachen und Wirkungen militärischer Ineffektivität in Sub-Sahara
Afrika, Berlin Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, www.swp-berlin.org/
common/get_document.php?asset_id=1929
Meredith, M. (2006) The State of Africa, London: Free Press
Meyer, A. (2009) ‘Regional Conflict and Management in Central Africa: From
FOMUC to MICOPAX’, African Security 2.2: 158–74
Ministry of Defence UK (2004) Africa Conflict Prevention Pool: The UK Sub-
Saharan Strategy for Conflict Prevention, London: MOD,
www.operations.mod.uk/africa/ACPPstrategy.pdf
Mtimkulu, B. (2005) ‘The African Union and Peace Support Operations’,
Conflict Trends 4: 34–6
Murithi, T. (2007) ‘The African Union’s Evolving Role in Peace Operations: The
African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the
African Union Mission in Somalia’, Africa Security Review 17.1: 70–82
Neethling, T. (1999) ‘Towards Joint Ventures: Use of UN Observer Missions in
Africa’, in J. Cilliers (ed.), From Peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies: Peace
Support Missions in Africa, Pretoria: South African Institute of International
Affairs and the Institute for Security Studies
Olonisakin, F. (1997) ‘Home-Made African Peacekeeping Initiatives’, Armed
Forces and Society 23.3: 349–72
Olukoshi, A. (1996) ‘Financing Peacekeeping Operations: The African
Experience’, in M. Vogt and S. Aminu (eds), Peacekeeping as a Security
Strategy in Africa: Chad and Liberia as Case Studies, Vol. 2, Enugu (Nigeria):
Fourth Dimension Publishing
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2007) Development
Aid at a Glance 2007, Statistics by Region, Paris: The Secretary General
Patel, B. et al. (2004) Liberia: From Intervention to Stabilisation, National
Defence University, Washington DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies
71
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 67
Peace Operations Factsheet (2005) US Support to African Capacity for Peace
Operations: The ACOTA Program, Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Center
Pitts, M. (1999) ‘Sub-Regional Solutions for African Conflict – The ECOMOG
Experiment’, The Journal of Conflict Studies 19.1: 49–68,
www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/bin/get4.cgi?directory=spring99/&filename=pitts.htm
Powell, K. (2005) The African Union’s Emerging Peace and Security Regime –
Opportunities and Challenges for Delivering on the Responsibility to Protect,
ISS Monograph Series 119
Prodi, R. (Chairman) (2008) ‘Report of the African Union-United Nations Panel
on Modalities for Support to African Union Peacekeeping Operations A/63/666,
S/2008/813 (“Prodi Report”)’, New York, 24 December
Ramsbotham, A.; Bah, A.M.S. and Calder, F. (2005a) ‘Enhancing African Peace
and Security Capacity: A Useful Role for the UK and the G8?’, International
Affairs 81.2: 325–39
—— (2005b) The Implementation of the Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance
African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations, London: Chatham
House
Revue Frères d’Armes (2009) ‘Promotion de la Coopération Opérationelle en
Afrique Centrale: Stage CAOME pour 4 Pays de la Sous-Région’, Revue
Frères d’Armes 254
Schmidt, S. (2007) ‘Die EU Sicherheitspolitik gegenüber Subsahara Afrika’, in
G. Müller-Brandeck (ed.), Die Afrikapolitik der Europäischen Union, Oplanden:
Budrich Verlag
Serafino, N.M. (2007) CRS Report for Congress, The Global Peace Operations
Initiative, Congressional Research Service, Washington DC, updated 11 June
Sesay, A. (1989) ‘The OAU Peacekeeping Force in Chad: Some Lessons for
Future Operations’, Current Research on Peace and Violence 12.4: 191–200
Shearer, D. (1999) ‘Africa’s Great War’, Survival, Summer, London: IISS
SHIRBRIG (2009) ComSHIRBRIG Closing Letter,
www.shirbrig.dk/html/main.htm
Sierra Leone News (2009) ‘Burundi and Sierra Leone Offered to Send More
Troops to an African Union (AU) Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia’, 15 May,
www.businessday.co.za/articles/world.aspx?ID=BD4A1000175
Swain, J. (2009) Kenyan Police Units Murder Hundreds,
www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article5162329.ece, 16 November
Tjønneland, E.N. and Albertyn, C. (2010) Navigating Complexity. A Review of
Training for Peace in Africa, Norad Collected Reviews 2/2010, Norwegian
Agency for Development Cooperation, Oslo, www.norad.no/en/
Tools+and+publications/Publications/Publication+Page?key=198782
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 67
72
Training for Peace (2009) Map of Activities since 1995,
www.trainingforpeace.org/about/map_of_activities_since_1995
Tuck, C. (2000) ‘Every Car Or Moving Object Gone: The ECOMOG Intervention
in Liberia’, African Studies Quarterly 4.1,
http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v4/v4i1a1.htm
United Kingdom National Archive (no year) Training for Peace Support
Operations, http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/
www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front%3Fpagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage
&c=Page&cid=1094236396086.
United Nations (2010) Monthly Summary of Contributors of Military and Police
Personnel, www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors
United Nations (2009a) DPKO Factsheet, www.un.org/Depts/dpko/
factsheet.pdf, (only accessible via UN homepage)
—— (2009b) Fifth Committee Takes up Financing to continue Logistical
Support Package for African Union Mission in Somalia, General Assembly,
GA/AB 3913
—— (2008a) Annex to the letter dated 8 April 2008 from the Permanent
Representative of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary General, S/2008/229
—— (2008b) UN System-wide Support to the African Union and its Partnership
for Africa’s Development Programme, E/ECA/COE/27/15
—— (2006a) Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, 17 January, the
Secretary-General, www.undg.org/docs/8483/8039/SG_s_Note_of_Guidance
_on_Integrated_Missions_Feb_2006.pdf
—— (2006b) Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP), Guidelines
Endorsed by the Secretary-General, 13 June
—— (2005a) Re-hatting ECOWAS Forces as UN Peacekeepers: Lessons
learned, New York: DPKO Best Practices Unit
—— (2005b) General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, A/60/L.1,
www.unis/unvienna.org/pdf/A/60/L.1.pdf
United States AfriCom (2009) Fact Sheet ACOTA, Headquarters United States
Africa Command, Stuttgart, www.africom/mil/printstory.asp?art=1886
United States General Accounting Office (2008) Peacekeeping. Thousands
Trained but United States is Unlikely to Complete All Activities by 2010 and
Some Improvements are Needed, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD
=ADA483224&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
—— (2002) UN Peacekeeping – Estimated US Contributions 1996–2001,
www.gao.gov/new.items/d02294.pdf
United States State Department (2009) Sudan: A Critical Moment, a
Comprehensive Approach, www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/oct/130672.htm
73
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 67
ViveLeCanada (2008) Canada’s Contribution to Peace and Human Needs in
Sudan, www.vivelecanada.ca/article/235929788-maxime-bernier-announces-
major-canadian-engagement-for-peace-in-sudan
Vogt, M. (1992) The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional
Peacekeeping, Lagos: Gabumo Publishing Group
Walta Information Centre (2010) AU, Italy Agree to Work Together on Peace
and Security in Africa, http://amharicpage.waltainfo.com/index2.php?option=
com_content&do_pdf=1&id=18638, 14 January 2010
Werlin, H.H. (2005) ‘Corruption and Foreign Aid in Africa’, Orbis 49.3: 517–27
White House (2009) Presidential Determination No. 2009-26, Washington DC,
8 September, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-determination-
assistance-economic-community-central-african-states
Williams, P.D. (2006) ‘Military Responses to Mass Killing: The African Union
Mission in Sudan’, International Peacekeeping 13.2: 168–83
